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SNAKE OIL SALESMEN OR PURVEYORS OF
KNOWLEDGE: OFF-LABEL PROMOTIONS
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DOCTRINE
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The Second Circuit’s December 2012 decision in United States v.
Caronia striking down the prohibition on off-label marketing of pharma-
ceutical drugs has profound implications for economic regulation in gen-
eral, calling into question the constitutionality of restrictions on the offer
and sale of securities under the Securities Act of 1933, the solicitation of
shareholder proxies and periodic reporting under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, mandatory labels on food, tobacco, and pesticides,
and a wide range of privacy protections.  In this Article we suggest that
Caronia misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding in Sorrell v. IMS
Health, which was motivated by concerns of favoring one industry par-
ticipant over another rather than a desire to return to the anti-regulator
fervor of the Lochner era.  Reexamining the theoretical justification for
limiting truthful commercial speech shows that a more nuanced ap-
proach to regulating off-label marketing with the purpose of promoting
public health and safety would pass constitutional muster.  We argue that
as long as the government both has a rational basis for subjecting a
particular industry to limits on commercial speech intended to further a
legitimate public interest, rather than unfounded paternalism, and does
not discriminate against disfavored industry participants, those limits
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson
standard. We believe that our articulation of the commercial speech doc-
trine post-Sorrell will help resolve the current split in the Circuits on the
appropriate standard of review in cases involving both restrictions on
commercial speech and mandated speech.  Finally, we critique the
FDA’s 2011 Guidance for Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-
Label Information (draft) and present a proposal for new rules for regu-
lating the off-label marketing of pharmaceutical drugs based on trans-
parency, the sophistication of the listener and the type of information
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offered, and the requirement that the pharmaceutical company comply
with ongoing duties of training, monitoring, reporting, and auditing.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
dealt a potentially fatal blow to the Food and Drug Administration’s ban
on off-label promotions of pharmaceuticals in a sweeping decision with
profound implications for the regulation of commercial speech.1  The
Second Circuit based its decision in substantial part on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s invalidation of a Vermont statute banning the sale of prescriber-
identifying information without the physician’s consent in Sorrell v. IMF
Health, Inc.2  The Second Circuit’s reasoning has the potential to under-
mine the constitutionality of numerous areas of federal regulation,3 in-
cluding regulation of the offer and sale of securities under the Securities
Act of 1933; the solicitation of shareholder proxies and periodic report-
ing under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; mandatory labels on
food,4 tobacco,5 and pesticides; and a wide range of privacy protections.6
As Justice Breyer warned in his dissent in Sorrell, this undue expansion
of the Free Speech rights of commercial actors, if left unchecked, threat-
ens a return to the anti-regulatory fervor of the Lochner era.7  In particu-
1 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
2 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
3 See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme
Court’s Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389,
405–06 & n.89 (2012).
4 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006); Food
Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004 § 203, 21 U.S.C. § 343(w).
5 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(striking down requirement of graphic warning labels on cigarette packages).
6 David Orentlicher, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash
Between the Public Interest in a Robust First Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective
Protection from Harm, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 299, 311 (2011).  These include laws protecting
medical information, video rental records, and certain consumer credit card information.
7 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (“To apply a ‘heightened’ standard of review in such cases
as a matter of course would risk what then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Central Hudson,
described as a ‘retur[n] to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in
which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a
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lar, mandating a laissez-faire “marketplace” of commercial promotions
as if that were the natural order bears an uncanny resemblance to Loch-
ner’s invalidation of a statute that interfered with employers’ right to
contract with workers on whatever terms the labor market would bear.8
But it is possible to prohibit discriminatory restraints on commercial
speech while preserving the federal government’s power to regulate the
activities of specific actors in commerce to protect health and safety pur-
suant to a fair reading of the police power.  Indeed, even though the FDA
chose not to appeal the Second Circuit’s ruling in Caronia, the issue of
commercial speech is sure to come before the Supreme Court in the not-
too-distant future.  For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia Circuit noted in May 2013 in Association of Manufacturers v.
SEC the split in the circuits as to whether certain types of commercial
speech should be judged under intermediate or strict scrutiny.9 A careful
look at United States v. Caronia,10 then, not only provides guidance for
State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to imple-
ment its considered policies.’”) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (arguing
that the Lochner Court erroneously believed that “[m]arket ordering under the common law
was . . . part of nature rather than a legal construct . . . .”).  For a contrary view, see David E.
Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003).
9 No. 13–cv–635, 2013 WL 3803918, at *28 (D.D.C. July 23, 2013) (“While some
circuits apply strict scrutiny once the case is found to fall outside of the Zauderer [v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)] standard, our Circuit
has rejected this dichotomous approach, holding instead that in evaluating the constitutionality
of compelled commercial speech, any ‘burdens imposed . . . receive a lower level of scrutiny
from courts.’” (quoting Philip Morris v. FDA, 566 F.3d 1205, 1142–43)).  Under the Zauderer
standard, “‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ disclosures are permissible if they are ‘reasona-
bly related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers,’ provided the require-
ments are not ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome.’” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696
F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C.Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Compare Disc. Tobacco City
& Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech
disclosure requirement fits within the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a
rational-basis standard.  If it does not, then we . . . apply strict scrutiny.”) with R.J. Reynolds,
696 F.3d at 1212, 1215 (government must establish that the disclosures “directly and materi-
ally advance[ ]” a “substantial” government interest (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566)
unless “the government shows that, absent a warning, there is a self-evident—or at least ‘po-
tentially real’—danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers.”).  Because the conflict
minerals disclosures mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
regulation Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240, 249b), at issue in Manufacturers Assoc. v. SEC, “are not aimed at preventing mislead-
ing or deceptive speech,” they were subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson—
”a concession that, under this [D.C.] Circuit’s precedent, removes this case from the Zauderer
framework.” Id. at 1214.  After evaluating both Dodd-Frank’s and the SEC’s requirements for
the mandatory public disclosure of whether certain minerals used in the production of publicly
traded firms’ products are Republic of the Congo “conflict-free,” the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that the required disclosures satisfied the test of intermedi-
ate scrutiny.
10 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
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future challenges to the commercial speech doctrine, but also provides
the opportunity to articulate a new standard for evaluating speech in reg-
ulated industries.11
We argue that as long as the government has a rational basis for
subjecting a particular industry to limits on commercial speech pursuant
to an “ordinary economic regulatory program[ ]”12 intended to further a
legitimate public interest rather than unfounded paternalism, and does
not discriminate against “disfavored” industry participants, those limits
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.13  This would enable the
Court to confine the heightened scrutiny applied in Sorrell to those cases
in which the government has played favorites among market participants
or sought to promote pure paternalism.  We believe that our proposed
standard would close the “Pandora’s Box of First Amendment chal-
lenges”14 to commercial regulations opened by Sorrell as long as “the
government seeks typical regulatory ends” with “speech-related conse-
quences [that] are indirect, incidental, and entirely commercial” and
thereby eliminate the risk of “reawaken[ing] Lochner’s pre-New Deal
threat of substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordi-
nary economic regulation is at issue.”15
In Part I we discuss the development of the commercial speech doc-
trine and its erosion in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Sorrell.
We then analyze the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia and argue that
it improperly extended Sorrell to ban virtually any restriction on off-label
promotions.  In Part II we articulate a theoretical justification for regulat-
ing truthful commercial speech based on the public interest and suggest a
new standard drawing on a key lesson from Sorrell and the analogous
case of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n—that the government
may not favor certain industry participants over others.  In Part III, we
then discuss the FDA’s 2011 Guidance for Industry: Responding to Un-
solicited Requests for Off-Label Information About Prescription Drugs
and Medical Devices draft16 and analyze it under our proposed standard.
11 This could apply not only to the traditional area of food and drug safety but also to
more controversial topics, such as regulating fast food ads directed to children, restrictions on
alcohol commercials when children are likely to be watching TV, or bans on tobacco-company
sponsorships of televised sporting events.
12 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
14 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2685.
16 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFF-
LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES (2011) [hereinafter
2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompli
anceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM285145.pdf.
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We draw on certain analogous provisions in the securities laws to guide
the development of a more narrowly tailored approach that balances the
need for dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading information about
off-label uses of prescription drugs with the need to prevent the wide-
spread sale of potentially dangerous drugs without adequate testing and
labeling.
I. SORRELL AND CARONIA: THE EROSION OF THE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: From Valentine v.
Chrestensen to Central Hudson
Prior to the 1970s, commercial speech enjoyed no protection under
the First Amendment.17  The first case to specifically address the ques-
tion of constitutional protection for advertising was Valentine v.
Chrestensen.18  F.J. Chrestensen, the owner of a decommissioned U.S.
Navy submarine, distributed printed handbills in New York City adver-
tising exhibitions of the submarine for profit.19  The New York City Po-
lice Department prohibited further distribution of the handbills, claiming
that it violated the City Sanitary Code, which “forbids distribution in the
streets of commercial and business advertising matter” but not “handbills
solely devoted to ‘information or a public protest.’”20  When Chresten-
sen then printed a double-faced handbill with a political protest on one
side and the advertisement on the other, the police told him that the two-
sided handbill was prohibited as well.21  The Court upheld the prohibi-
tion stating summarily that “the Constitution imposes no such restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”22
Thus began a period during which there seemed to be few limita-
tions on the state’s ability to restrict commercial advertising.  In Breard
v. City of Alexandria,23 for example, the Court refused to strike down an
17 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:1 (2011) (“For many years com-
mercial speech was regarded as outside the protection of the Constitution.”).
18 316 U.S. 52 (1942).  Some, however, point to Justice Roberts’ dicta in Schneider v.
State as the forerunner of the commercial speech doctrine: “We are not to be taken as holding
that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordi-
nance requires.”  308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939); see, e.g., Lawrence Alexander, Speech in the
Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. for Local Regulatory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357 (1977); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 747, 771–72 (1993).
19 316 U.S. at 53.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 53.
22 Id. at 54.
23 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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ordinance prohibiting door-to-door advertising of commercial products.24
Writing for the majority, Justice Reed emphasized that the First Amend-
ment does not extend to commercial speech:
Only the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this
[First Amendment] point.  It was not open to the solici-
tors for gadgets or brushes. . . .  We agree that the fact
that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the
protection of the First Amendment.  The selling, how-
ever, brings into the transaction a commercial feature.25
In the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,26 the Supreme Court changed direction.
The case concerned a Virginia state law that barred the publication and
advertising of prescription drug prices.27  The ban hurt consumers, who
were often unaware that a particular drug could be found more cheaply at
a nearby pharmacy or in another city.28  The Court overruled Valentine v.
Chrestensen29  and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.
The Court condemned Virginia’s “highly paternalistic approach” towards
truthful information,30 reasoning that “information is not in itself harm-
ful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the chan-
nels of communication rather than to close them.”31
The Court highlighted the importance of the free flow of informa-
tion to facilitate efficient economic transactions:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it some-
times may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of infor-
mation as to who is producing and selling what product,
for what reason, and at what price.  So long as we pre-
serve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allo-
cation of our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions.  It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the ag-
gregate, be intelligent and well informed.  To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.32
24 Id. at 625.
25 Id. at 641–42.
26 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
27 Id. at 749–50.
28 Id. at 754.
29 Id. at 762.
30 Id. at 772.
31 Id. at 770.
32 Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy extended constitutional protec-
tion for commercial speech under an anti-paternalism, pro-free market of
ideas theory.  But the Court did not articulate a doctrinal standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of commercial speech until its decision in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission33 in
1980.
Central Hudson involved an order by the New York Public Service
Commission requiring electric utilities to cease promotional advertising
that encouraged the use of electricity because of a shortage of fuel in the
1973–74 winter.34  Central Hudson challenged the prohibition under the
First Amendment, but the New York Court of Appeals upheld it, ruling
that advertising in the “noncompetitive market in which electric corpora-
tions operate” had little economic benefit.35
The Supreme Court reversed in an 8–1 decision.  Although the
Court reiterated that commercial speech is protected by the First Amend-
ment,36 it explained that commercial speech is entitled to “lesser protec-
tion”37 than the political speech at the heart of the First Amendment.
Instead of subjecting commercial speech to strict scrutiny, the Court
adopted a four-part intermediate scrutiny test: (1) to be protected, the
speech must concern a lawful activity, (2) the governmental restriction
must serve a substantial interest, (3) the regulation must directly advance
this interest, and (4) the regulatory scheme must be no more extensive
than necessary to achieve this substantial interest.38  Although the Court
found that the advertising concerned lawful activity and the governmen-
tal regulation directly sought to advance the substantial interest of energy
conservation and the fairness and efficiency of utility rates,39 the Court
ruled that the prohibition failed the final requirement of being non-exces-
sive: “the energy conservation rationale . . . cannot justify suppressing
information about electric devices or services that would cause no net
increase in total energy use . . . no showing has been made that a more
limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not
33 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
34 Id. at 558–59.
35 Id. at 561 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 390 N.E.2d 749, 757
(N.Y. 1979)).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 563.
38 Id. at 563–64. See also National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13–cv–635, 2013 WL
3803918, at *30 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2013) (“[I]t is well established that “‘the least restrictive
means’ is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable ‘fit between the legisla-
ture’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.’”).
39 Id. at 568–69.
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serve adequately the State’s interests.”40  Accordingly, the Court held
that the order was unconstitutional.41
B. Chipping Away at Intermediate Scrutiny
Even after Central Hudson, it was unclear whether the state may
“keep citizens in the dark” by “completely suppress[ing] the dissemina-
tion of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity.”42
The Court upheld outright prohibitions on truthful speech in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,43 concluding that
if the government has the power to prohibit an activity (in this case,
gambling), then it has the power to prohibit advertising of that activity.
Similarly, in the 1993 case United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,44 the
Court refused to strike down a federal statute prohibiting broadcasters
from advertising lotteries other than those operated by the state that li-
censed the station.45  Despite the absence of any false or misleading con-
tent, the Court held that “this congressional policy of balancing the
interests of lottery and nonlottery States” qualified as a “substantial gov-
ernment interest that satisfies Central Hudson.”46
The Court dramatically changed course a mere three years later
when it struck down a Rhode Island ban on advertising liquor prices in
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island.47  The plurality opinion penned by Jus-
tice Stevens condemned the “State’s paternalistic assumption that the
public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information
unwisely.”48
In a similar vein, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,
the Court struck down a prohibition on manufacturers’ soliciting and ad-
vertising compounded pharmaceutical drugs under the Central Hudson
framework.49  Compounding is a technique of combining existing drugs
to more suitably tailor the treatment to the needs of individual patients.
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 permits
compounding without FDA preapproval provided that a number of re-
quirements are met, including that the prescription is “unsolicited” and—
most critically—that the pharmacist “not advertise or promote the com-
40 Id. at 570.
41 Id. at 572.
42 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773
(1976).
43 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
44 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
45 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1307 (2006).
46 Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 428.
47 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
48 Id. at 487.
49 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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pounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug.”50  The
Court recognized that “[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of the
FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly an important governmental
interest, and the Government has every reason to want as many drugs as
possible to be subject to that approval process.”51  Nonetheless, it held
that the government had failed to articulate a sufficient justification for
the broad prohibition on advertising, rejecting the paternalistic notion
that “people would make bad decisions if given truthful information
about compounded drugs.”52  The Court also identified several less re-
strictive alternatives available to Congress, including prohibiting the use
of commercial-scale manufacturing or testing equipment for com-
pounding, prohibiting compounding in advance of anticipated prescrip-
tions, banning the sale of compounded drugs at wholesale prices, limiting
out-of-state sales or capping overall sales of compounded drugs.53
In Educational Media Co. v. Swecker, the Fourth Circuit upheld a
prohibition on alcohol advertisements in two college newspapers.54  With
respect to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test, the
court deferentially concluded that the “link between [the advertising pro-
hibition] and decreasing demand for alcohol by college students” is “am-
ply supported by the record.”55  Moreover, the court emphasized, it “only
prohibits certain types of alcohol advertisements,” “allows restaurants to
inform readers about the presence and type of alcohol they serve,” “only
applies to college student publications—campus publications targeted at
students under twenty-one,” and “does not, on its face, affect all possible
student publications on campus.”56
The key distinction between Swecker and the seemingly contradic-
tory line of reasoning in 44 Liquormart and Western States Medical is
that the advertising prohibition sought to reduce “the serious problem of
underage drinking and abusive drinking by college students,” which the
Swecker court found to be a substantial government interest.57  This in-
terest is one of public safety and health, rather than a mere paternalistic
restriction on individual decision-making by consumers legally permitted
to buy a product.  Abusive drinking affects society as a whole, not just a
single individual, and we suggest this difference is not only descriptively
relevant to distinguishing between outcomes in Swecker, 44 Liquormart,
and Western States Medical, but is also normatively valuable in con-
50 21 U.S.C. § 353a(c) (2006).
51 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 369.
52 Id. at 386.
53 Id. at 372.
54 Educational Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010).
55 Id. at 590.
56 Id. at 590–91.
57 Id. at 589.
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structing a theory of the proper bounds of limits on commercial speech.
It is worth keeping this animating distinction in mind in the following
discussion of Sorrell and our critique of Caronia in Section 0.
C. Sorrell v. IMS Health
It is apparent, then, that Sorrell v. IMS Health58 was decided against
the backdrop of increasing suspicion concerning paternalistic prevention
of the dissemination of truthful information.  The case arose out of a
2007 law enacted by the Vermont state legislature that prohibited phar-
maceutical manufacturers from using records of pharmacy prescriptions
for purposes of marketing to physicians.59  Prior to the 2007 law, phar-
macies would sell physician-identifying prescribing information to com-
panies engaged in “data mining,” which would then lease this
information to pharmaceutical manufacturers.  The manufacturers would
use this information to more effectively target brand name drug market-
ing efforts to each doctor in light of his or her prescribing history.60
The legislative findings accompanying the statute emphasized that
“the goals of marketing programs are often in conflict with the goals of
the state” and the “marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effec-
tiveness is frequently one-sided in that brand-name companies invest in
expensive pharmaceutical marketing campaigns to doctors.”61 This
causes “doctors [to] prescribe[e] drugs based on incomplete and biased
information.”62  Even though the legislature made additional findings re-
garding the effect of such marketing, such as “increas[ing] the cost of
health care and health insurance,”63 the primary justification for the pro-
hibition was the need to avoid a cognitive process that distorted physi-
cians’ choice of brand-name drugs instead of the generic alternatives.64
These rationales evidenced a strong paternalistic motive.
Rejecting the need to protect physicians from themselves, the Sor-
rell Court emphasized the importance of the free flow of information,
quoting from its 1976 decision in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
58 Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
59 See An Act Relating to Increasing Transparency of Prescription Drug Pricing and
Information, 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635, 650–53 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4631 (2013)).
60 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
61 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves at 635.
62 Id.
63 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves at 637).  Although Ver-
mont also defended the statute as necessary to protect the privacy of the prescribing physician,
that rationale was rejected because the prescriber-identifying information was made available
to the government and other “favored” listeners. Id. at 2668.
64 See id. at 2670 (“If prescriber-identifying information were available for use by detail-
ers, the State contends, then detailing would be effective in promoting brand-name drugs that
are more expensive and less safe than generic alternatives.”).
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.: “The First Amendment directs us to be
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good.”65  The Court
pointed out that “[t]hese precepts apply with full force when the audi-
ence, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of ‘sophisticated and
experienced’ consumers.”66  The Court also recognized that the First
Amendment protects not just the rights of listeners but also the rights of
speakers—here, the data miners and drug manufacturers.
We will have more to say on the theoretical issues surrounding the
free-market-of-information approach to regulating commercial speech in
Part II.  But it is worth noting at this juncture that, while many areas of
existing regulation of truthful commercial speech—such as the regula-
tion of offers of securities under the Securities Act of 1933—are geared
towards unsophisticated consumers, not all are.  Indeed, if the Court’s
stated rationale in Sorrell were limited to sophisticated consumers, the
ambit of its decision might not be as far-reaching.  But the Court went
much further, striking down the Vermont law because
[t]he State has imposed content- and speaker-based re-
strictions on the availability and use of prescriber-identi-
fying information.  So long as they do not engage in
marketing, many speakers can obtain and use the infor-
mation.  But detailers cannot.  Vermont’s statute could
be compared with a law prohibiting trade magazines
from purchasing or using ink.  Like that hypothetical
law, § 4631(d) imposes a speaker- and content-based
burden on protected expression, and that circumstance is
sufficient to justify application of heightened scrutiny.67
As we explain in Part II.D.2, we prefer to read this narrowly in light
of the legislature’s intentional discrimination against brand-name manu-
facturers in favor of their generic competitors.  But a less charitable in-
terpretation might conclude that the Court is imposing strict scrutiny
simply because the regulation at issue only applies to a certain group
within the population at large (a “speaker-based burden”) and only with
respect to certain types of dialogue (a “content-based burden”).  As
others have noted,68 such a reading would represent a dramatic expan-
65 Id. at 2671 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508
(1996)).
66 Id. at 2671.
67 Id. at 2667 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983)).
68 See, e.g., Isabelle Bibet-Kalinyak, A Critical Analysis of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.:
Pandora’s Box at Best, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191 (2012); John N. Joseph et al., Is Sorrell the
Death Knell for FDA’s Off-Label Marketing Restrictions?, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Feb.
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sion of First Amendment protection for commercial speech and the prac-
tical elimination of the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard.
These implications were not lost on the three dissenting Justices.  In
an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the dissenting Justices cited Jus-
tice Holmes’s well-known dissent in Lochner v. New York and pointed
out:
[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that
touch upon commercial messages, the Court’s vision of
its reviewing task threatens to return us to a happily by-
gone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its inter-
ference with economic liberty.  History shows that the
power was much abused and resulted in the constitution-
alization of economic theories preferred by individual
jurists.  By inviting courts to scrutinize whether a State’s
legitimate regulatory interests can be achieved in less re-
strictive ways whenever they touch (even indirectly)
upon commercial speech, today’s majority risks repeat-
ing the mistakes of the past in a manner not anticipated
by our precedents.69
In short, the essence of Justice Breyer’s critique is that most forms of
substantive regulation have some effect on commercial speech.  Any
transaction between two parties necessarily involves speech—restricting
the transaction is often impossible without restricting the speech.
Indeed, numerous areas of federal regulation restrict speech antece-
dent to or in parallel with economic transactions.  For example, section
5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits making an “offer to sell or
offer to buy . . . any security, unless a registration statement has been
filed as to such security.”70  As offers are plainly commercial speech,
subjecting the prohibition on making offers for unregistered securities to
strict scrutiny could lead to the conclusion that section 5(c) is unconstitu-
tional.71  We discuss this and other concerning possibilities at length in
2012, at 1; Pomeranz, supra note 3; Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free R
Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 130.
69 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905)).
70 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006).
71 Similarly, Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2006),
prohibits a person from receiving compensation from an issuer in exchange for writing about a
security unless the compensation is fully disclosed.  As explained by Samp, supra note 68, at
142, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit subjected the limitations in Section 17(b)
to “limited First Amendment scrutiny,” reasoning: “In areas of extensive federal regulation—
like securities dealing—we do not believe that the Constitution requires the judiciary to weigh
the relative merits of particular regulatory objectives that impinge upon communications oc-
curring within the umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme.”  SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst.,
851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Part II.A, but suffice it to say that an expansive reading of the Court’s
reasoning in Sorrell suggests the extinction of the commercial speech
doctrine.  At the very least, Sorrell suggests that the intermediate scru-
tiny standard in Central Hudson may not be so intermediate after all.
D. United States v. Caronia: Prohibiting Truthful Marketing of Off-
Label Use by Prescription Drug Manufacturers
1. Background and Context
The original Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 did not require preap-
proval of pharmaceutical drugs.72  The predominant paradigm was one of
ex post enforcement through litigation over false claims.73  But in 1911,
the Supreme Court held that the antifraud prohibition did not extend to
claims relating to the effect of a drug on a patient’s health but only fac-
tual descriptions such as the drug’s ingredients.74  Despite the enactment
of a subsequent statutory amendment in 1912 prohibiting fraud,75 the
standard of intentional misrepresentation proved too high a burden to
effectively reduce false claims in drug advertising.76  Yet it took another
twenty-six years, after more than one hundred people died from a poison-
ous “Elixir Sulfanilamide,” before Congress enacted the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1938.77
The sulfanilamide fiasco led to the imposition of a requirement in
the FDCA for preapproval before a drug may be marketed,78 reflecting
the recognition that ex post litigation provided insufficient deterrence.
Section 505(a) of the FDCA states plainly, “No person shall introduce or
deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an
approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this
section is effective with respect to such drug.”79  The remainder of sec-
tion 505 specifies detailed requirements for such an application and
prescribes the process by which approval of a new drug may be
granted.80
72 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed
1938).  For a detailed overview of the history of the FDCA, see generally Wallace F. Janssen,
Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420
(1981).
73 See Janssen, supra note 72, at 427. R
74 United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
75 Sherley Amendment, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912).
76 See Janssen, supra note 72, at 427–28. R
77 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938); Janssen, supra note 72, at 429. R
78 Id. (“Drug manufacturers were required to provide scientific proof that new products
could be safely used before putting them on the market—the sulfanilamide experience had
started what is now the major system of U. S. drug regulation.”).
79 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
80 See id. § 355(b)–(w).
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Two essential aspects of this approval process are the requirements
that a new drug be “safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recom-
mended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof” and that it may
“responsibly be concluded . . . that the drug will have the effect it pur-
ports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling
thereof.”81  Accordingly, marketing a drug for a use other than that
which appears on the proposed labeling would seem to raise concerns
regarding safety and efficacy.82  The FDCA, however, does not expressly
prohibit marketing a drug for “off-label” uses.  Rather, it prohibits “mis-
branding,” which is defined as “[t]he introduction or delivery for intro-
duction into interstate commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is . . .
misbranded.”83  This circular language ultimately turns on the definition
of “misbranded,” which the statute defines to include labeling that lacks
“adequate directions for use.”84  The statutory definition makes no refer-
ence to marketing, promotion, or even approved uses.
The FDA, however, enacted regulations that go beyond simple mis-
labeling.  They define “adequate directions for use” to include “direc-
tions under which the layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes
for which it is intended.”85  “Intended use” is further defined as
the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of drugs.  The intent is determined by such
persons’ expressions or may be shown by the circum-
stances surrounding the distribution of the article.  This
objective intent may, for example, be shown by labeling
claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements
by such persons or their representatives. It may be
shown by the circumstances that the article is, with the
knowledge of such persons or their representatives, of-
fered and used for a purpose for which it is neither la-
beled nor advertised.86
Accordingly, under these FDA regulations, the government may estab-
lish misbranding by showing that the drug’s labeling diverges from the
“intended use” by its manufacturer, which may be shown by statements
made by its representatives.  Misbranding is a crime punishable by up to
81 Id. § 355(d).
82 That said, questions regarding the safety of a drug are less important for new indica-
tions than those of effectiveness.  Most off-label use is tangential to an existing approved use
and thus has an applicable and often robust safety profile.  Furthermore, the industry is often
seeking to promote off-label use through the dissemination of clinical studies.
83 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006).
84 Id. § 352(f).
85 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2013).
86 Id. § 201.128 (emphasis added).
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three years in prison or $10,000 in fines per occurrence,87 which can
accumulate to millions or even billions of dollars.  It is essential to ob-
serve that this convoluted statutory and regulatory scheme means that
misbranding is a crime that applies to manufacturers and their represent-
atives only—any other party may freely discuss and even promote a drug
for unapproved uses because they do not fall within the ambit of the
labeling statute.
Indeed, the Department of Justice has recently pursued misbranding
cases that have led to multi-billion dollar judgments.  In July 2012, Glax-
oSmithKline LLC pled guilty and agreed to pay $3 billion in fines and
forfeitures over charges of misbranding the drugs Paxil, Wellbutrin, and
Avandia.88  In May 2012, Abbott Laboratories pled guilty and agreed to
pay $1.6 billion to settle charges that it had illegally marketed
Depakote.89  In 2010, Pfizer similarly paid $2.3 billion to resolve charges
of misbranding Bextra and illegally promoting Geodon, Zyvox, and
Lyrica.90  In all of these cases, a primary theory of liability was market-
ing for an unapproved use, not necessarily that the advertised use was
false or misleading.91
As several commentators have noted, Sorrell v. IMS Health reflects
a substantial weakening of the commercial speech doctrine set out in
Central Hudson, which calls into question the constitutionality of the
87 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).
88 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3
Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data: Largest Health Care
Fraud Settlement in U.S. History (Jul. 2, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/July/12-civ-842.html.
89 Terry Frieden & Tom Watkins, Abbott Laboratories to Pay $1.6 Billion Over Mis-
branding Drug, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/07/justice/abbott-fine-drug (May 7,
2012, 6:29 PM).
90 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health
Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sep. 2, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2009/September/09-civ-900.html.
91 Affirming a conviction for medical device sales without FDA approval, the Second
Circuit acknowledged the classic objection to commercial speech regulation in this context:
[I]f a given use is lawful, and thus can be written about freely in newspapers or
blogs, and discussed among hospitals . . . doesn’t it make a good deal of sense to
allow speech by the manufacturer, which after all will have the best information?
Why privilege speech by the uninformed?
United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008).  But the court rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that “if a manufacturer’s promise to the FDA to avoid speech about off-label
uses is unenforceable, the FDA may respond by withholding any approval of drugs or devices
that have questionable additional uses.” Id.; see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Some have advocated that off-label use should constitute the stan-
dard of care in a medical malpractice action because it reflects “the safest, most effective,
state-of-the-art treatment.”  Mark Herrmann & Pearson Bownas, Keeping the Label Out of the
Case, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 477, 486 (2009).
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FDA’s regulation of off-label marketing.92  In United States v.
Caronia,93 the Second Circuit took the erosion of the intermediate scru-
tiny standard for commercial speech to a new level.  The facts of
Caronia are straightforward.  Alfred Caronia was a sales representative
for Orphan Medical, Inc., manufacturer of Xyrem, a drug approved by
the FDA to treat narcolepsy.94  Along with co-defendant Dr. Peter
Gleason,95 Caronia marketed Xyrem to doctors at various events and
one-on-one meetings.96  In one such meeting, Caronia was secretly re-
corded promoting Xyrem for uses not approved by the FDA such as
chronic pain, fatigue, and fibromyalgia.97  Caronia was charged with pro-
moting an unapproved use of a pharmaceutical drug in violation of the
FDCA, a federal crime through a convoluted interaction of statutory lan-
guage and FDA rulemaking.
The appeal in Caronia was limited to the question of whether these
regulations are constitutional under the First Amendment.  The constitu-
tional question arises from the selective nature of the prohibition on pro-
moting off-label uses: again, only manufacturers and their
representatives are subject to the restriction under this unique statutory
and regulatory scheme.  Congress and the FDA could have prohibited
off-label promotion entirely, but they did not, likely for political reasons,
as others have suggested.98  Moreover, the prohibition on off-label mar-
keting is not restricted to false or misleading statements, which would be
independently actionable under the existing law of fraud.  This is simply
an outright ban on promoting the off-label uses of a drug that applies
solely to manufacturers and their representatives.
In a 2–1 opinion, the Second Circuit vacated Caronia’s conviction,
holding that prosecution solely for promoting off-label uses violated the
First Amendment.99  In its appeal, the government attempted to argue it
92 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 68; Kate Maternowski, Note, The Commercial Speech
Doctrine Barely Survives Sorrell, 38 J.C. & U.L. 629 (2012); Samp, supra note 68, at 130
(“Several justices have expressed a willingness to eliminate the doctrinal distinctions between
commercial speech and other forms of speech[ ] . . . [but] the Court’s majority is not yet
willing to take that step.”).
93 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
94 Id. at 155.
95 Dr. Gleason and Orphan Medical pled guilty to charges of misbranding under the
FDCA. Id. at 158.
96 Id. at 156.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising,
the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection,
37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 323 (2011) (“What began as an effort to control off-label prescribing
by physicians thus shifted to the use of a federal statute to constrain manufacturer speech about
such prescribing—purely, it would seem, because physicians so vociferously objected to any
insinuation by the FDA into decisions relating to the circumstances in which lawfully mar-
keted drugs would be used.”).
99 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 160 (2d Cir. 2012).
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was not prosecuting Caronia for the speech per se but rather was using
the off-label marketing solely as proof of intent to distribute misbranded
drugs, in line with the text of the FDA regulation.100  The court, how-
ever, rejected that argument, emphasizing that the trial record “confirms
overwhelmingly that Caronia was, in fact, prosecuted and convicted for
promoting Xyrem off-label.”101  Moreover, the court emphasized, “[t]he
government never argued in summation or rebuttal that the promotion
was evidence of intent,” and indeed:
[T]he government never suggested that Caronia engaged
in any form of misbranding other than the promotion of
the off-label use of an FDA-approved drug.  The govern-
ment never suggested, for example, that Caronia con-
spired to place false or deficient labeling on a drug.
Rather, the record makes clear that the government pros-
ecuted Caronia for his promotion and marketing
efforts.102
Accordingly, the Second Circuit analyzed the constitutionality of
Caronia’s prosecution under the theory that the off-label marketing alone
constituted a violation of the FDCA.
The majority based its holding on two seemingly independent theo-
ries: first, that the FDA regulations are content-based and speaker-based
restrictions on speech, thus justifying strict scrutiny under Sorrell; and
second, that the FDA regulations fail even the more lenient test of inter-
mediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.  As we explain, however, it is
doubtful that the court’s application of these tests are truly independent.
Indeed, the approach taken by the majority has profound implications.
2. Analogy to Sorrell and Strict Scrutiny
In its first justification for finding Caronia’s prosecution unconstitu-
tional, the majority heavily relied on Sorrell, identifying two fatal flaws
in the FDA’s prohibition of off-label marketing: (a) the prohibition only
applies to speech with specific content; and (b) it applies solely to phar-
maceutical manufacturers.103  The majority analogized both of these to
the data mining law in Sorrell that was found unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.  As in Sorrell, the majority suggested, the FDA is seek-
ing to restrict a specific type of speech—marketing off-label drug uses—
while the underlying conduct remains entirely legal.104  Moreover, like
100 Id. at 160–61.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citations omitted).
103 Id. at 165.
104 Id. (“Indeed, the content of the regulated speech drives this construction of the FDCA;
as in Sorrell, the ‘express purpose and practical effect’ of the government’s ban on promotion
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Sorrell, this restraint “targets one kind of speaker—pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers—while allowing others to speak without restriction.”105  It is a
straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sorrell,
the majority concluded, to subject the FDA’s content-based and speaker-
based prohibition on commercial speech to strict scrutiny.  Indeed, the
criminal charges against Caronia justify “more careful scrutiny” than the
one applied in Sorrell, which concerned civil liability.106
A more careful look at the two cases, however, suggests that this
analogy is less straightforward than the majority suggests.  The Supreme
Court emphasized that the law in Sorrell had the “express purpose and
practical effect” of “diminish[ing] the effectiveness of marketing by
manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”107  In other words, the regulation
did not merely target a specific segment of the public but actively dis-
criminated between brand-name and generic manufacturers; the court
thus noted: “it appears that Vermont could supply academic organiza-
tions with prescriber-identifying information to use in countering the
messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in promoting
the prescription of generic drugs.”108  Indeed, as we explain more fully
below, there is a key distinction between restricting the scope of regula-
tion to its functionally justified target—i.e., the segment of society that
must be brought within its scope for the regulation to function effec-
tively—and discriminating between parties in an arbitrary and unfair
manner, i.e., to the benefit of one and detriment of another.109
Indeed, this concern of arbitrarily favoring one industry participant
or type of good over another seemed to animate the Court’s decision in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, where it struck down a prohi-
bition on the sale of violent video games to minors.110  While Brown was
a core speech case, the Court emphasized the analogous point that “Cali-
fornia has singled out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treat-
ment—at least when compared to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie
producers—and has given no persuasive reason why.”111  In our view, as
a descriptive matter this fundamental consideration moves the Court.
is to ‘diminish the effectiveness of [off-label drug] marketing by manufacturers.”) (quoting
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011)).
105 Id.
106 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct.
2705, 2724 (2010)).
107 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (emphasis added).
108 Id.
109 Indeed, an additional unique aspect of Sorrell was that federal and state governments
are large purchasers of pharmaceutical drugs as well.  Government is acting both as a buyer
and regulator when it prohibits data mining, and thus seems to have an inherent conflict of
interest in favoring generics.
110 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740–42 (2011).
111 Id. at 2740.
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Moreover, as we explain in Part III, we suggest that the principle of not
favoring one industry participant over another should constitute a foun-
dational principle of a comprehensive revision of the FDA’s approach to
regulating off-label marketing.112
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA
recently struck down the FDA’s mandatory graphic labeling for cigarette
packaging under Central Hudson.113  The court formally decided the
case by finding that the FDA failed to provide any evidence that the
graphic warnings would “directly advance” the FDA’s interest in reduc-
ing smoking,114 but its presentation of the question is telling: “how much
leeway should this Court grant the government when it seeks to compel a
product’s manufacturer to convey the state’s subjective—and perhaps
even ideological—view that consumers should reject this otherwise le-
gal, but disfavored, product.”115  It seems that the court was particularly
disturbed by the discrimination among equally legal products in an in-
dustry.  This view is consistent with our proposal to subject restrictions
on truthful commercial speech to more deferential intermediate scrutiny
under Central Hudson as long as the truthful commercial speech does not
favor one industry participant over another.
The Caronia majority’s content-based argument is even more sus-
pect.  In Sorrell, the Court emphasized the legislature’s “expressed state-
ment of purpose” to “target those speakers and their messages for
disfavored treatment,” i.e., “messages that ‘are often in conflict with the
goals of the state.’”116 This was the content-based restriction the Court
found to justify strict scrutiny—an explicit legislative intent to prohibit
messages that contradicted its ex ante goals for ideal public discourse on
the advantages and disadvantages of various pharmaceuticals.  There was
no such intent in the development of the FDA’s off-label marketing regu-
112 Indeed, our approach can guide the resolution of a recent split between the Second and
Sixth Circuits over the applicable standard of review when regulating truthful commercial
speech.  In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that strict
scrutiny applies to such restrictions.  Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir. 2012) (“If a commercial-speech disclosure requirement fits within
the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a rational-basis standard.  If it does
not, then we . . . apply strict scrutiny.”) (citations omitted).  The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia expressly disagreed with this position in National Association of Manu-
facturers v. SEC, emphasizing the contrary precedent of the D.C. Circuit. National Ass’n of
Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13–cv–635, 2013 WL 3803918, at *28 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2013) (“While some
circuits apply strict scrutiny once the case is found to fall outside of the Zauderer standard, our
Circuit has rejected this dichotomous approach, holding instead that in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of compelled commercial speech, any ‘burdens imposed . . . receive a lower level of
scrutiny from courts.’”) (citations omitted).
113 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
114 Id. at 1219.
115 Id. at 1212 (emphasis added).
116 Id. (quoting 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635).
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lations, which sought to promote public health by preventing the need-
less purchase of ineffective drugs and exposure of patients to
unnecessary potential safety risks.117  Controlling unduly paternalistic
opinion restrictions on commercial speech is fundamentally different
from preventing misallocation of resources and protecting patient health.
The FDA was not seeking to silence contrary opinion but rather to
discourage the use of drugs in ways that are potentially ineffective or
unsafe.  If anything, the FDA’s regulation was arguably content-neu-
tral—it did not prohibit the content of marketing messages, e.g., specific
words or phrases.  Rather, it sought to ensure that, regardless of the pre-
cise marketing message, manufacturers’ inherent interest in selling their
products would not unnecessarily endanger patients’ health.  The require-
ment of obtaining FDA approval for specific uses before the products
may be legally marketed can be understood as a prophylactic means of
achieving this goal.  Now, this restriction currently sweeps too far in our
view—but that does not imply that the FDA intended to suppress a cer-
tain viewpoint, as the Vermont legislature did in Sorrell.  Accordingly,
Sorrell does not seem to justify the application of strict scrutiny in
Caronia.
Moreover, as Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Le-
gal Foundation, points out,118 the Sorrell Court acknowledged that limits
on commercial speech might be warranted to protect against fraud,119 to
suppress false commercial speech or commercial speech that proposes an
illegal transaction,120 or to protect privacy.121  As we explained above,
the FDA does not ban the discussion of off-label uses per se.  It bans the
promotion of misbranded drugs, which do not bear adequate warnings.
Because it is illegal to sell misbranded drugs, such promotions might be
viewed as proposing an illegal transaction.
Indeed, the First Amendment doctrine with respect to noncommer-
cial speech takes a deferential approach to content-neutrality, i.e., time,
place, or manner, restrictions.  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the
Court upheld a New York City ordinance that required use of a sound
technician and amplification equipment approved by the City in order to
117 See Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 98, at 320–21.
118 Samp, supra note 68, at 138.
119 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“The Court has noted, for
example, that ‘a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in
others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in its view greater there.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992))).
120 Id. at 2664 (reasoning that bans on false commercial speech and a ban on commercial
speech that proposes an illegal transaction are “restrictions directed at commerce or conduct”
that impose only “incidental burdens on speech”).
121 Id. at 2668 (noting that the medical record privacy provisions in the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2, “would present quite a dif-
ferent case”).
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prevent excessive music volume at outdoor concerts.122  The Court em-
phasized that a content-neutral regulatory scheme “need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means” of accomplishing the governmental
interest.123  Similarly, the Court emphasized that the content-neutral test
applies whenever the government has not “adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”124  Here,
the FDA has plainly not adopted its restrictions in order to target a spe-
cific economic actor or a group of actors.  The agency’s regulations limit
off-label promotion by brand-name and generic drug manufacturers
alike.  Accordingly, by analogy to noncommercial speech, lower scrutiny
should apply to this content- and speaker-neutral restriction.  Indeed,
reading Sorrell as broadly as the majority suggests would have profound
implications for the constitutionality of several federal regulatory re-
gimes, as we discuss further below.
3. Central Hudson: Intermediate Scrutiny in Name Only?
The second justification given by the Caronia majority for vacating
Caronia’s conviction was that the FDA regulation failed the traditional
four-prong intermediate scrutiny test of Central Hudson for the constitu-
tionality of a restriction on commercial speech.125  As explained above,
under Central Hudson as long as the commercial speech (1) concerns
lawful activity and is not false or misleading, a prohibition will be upheld
only if it advances (2) a substantial government interest, (3) directly ad-
vances that interest, and is (4) “not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”126  While the Caronia majority found that the first
two elements of the Central Hudson test were satisfied, it held that the
third and fourth were not.
With respect to the third element, the majority concluded:
As off-label drug use itself is not prohibited, it does not
follow that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-la-
bel drug usage by a particular class of speakers would
directly further the government’s goals of preserving the
efficacy and integrity of the FDA’s drug approval pro-
cess and reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffec-
tive drugs.127
122 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
123 Id. at 798.
124 Id. at 791.
125 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 571–72
(1980).
126 Id. at 566.
127 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Of course, this conclusory finding shows no deference to the agency’s
determination regarding the effect of off-label marketing or even an ex-
planation why this does not “directly” further the goal of protecting pa-
tient safety.  Reducing the marketing of off-label drug usage would seem
to have some corresponding effect on actual use.  And since off-label
usage has not undergone FDA review for safety and effectiveness, it
seems reasonable to suppose that on average, unapproved uses of a drug
are less effective or more risky than approved uses.  Accordingly, it does
not take particularly strong assumptions to reach the conclusion that re-
ducing off-label marketing would tend, on average, to directly improve
allocative efficiency—the expenditure of resources on drugs that are
most effective—and patient safety.  That is not to say that these are the
only relevant considerations, but the Caronia majority’s summary con-
clusion that there is no such direct effect seems unfounded.  A failure to
prohibit the underlying activity—off-label usage—does not imply that
prohibiting off-label marketing would not achieve a similar end.
It is interesting to note that the majority follows this conclusory as-
sertion with a citation to Sorrell and a parenthetical explanation: “hold-
ing government interest in protecting physician privacy not directly
served when law made prescriber-identifying information available to
‘all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers.’”128  This suggests that the
Caronia majority is actually applying the strict scrutiny analysis it em-
ployed previously, despite referring to Central Hudson and its “less rig-
orous intermediate test.”129  Indeed, one has to wonder if this is merely
intermediate scrutiny in name only.  The court showed no deference to
the FDA’s view on the link between marketing and usage and, by citing
Sorrell yet again, the court seems to be fixated on the supposed speaker-
based restriction.  Interestingly, the bulk of its discussion of the third
prong focuses not on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” fur-
therance of a governmental interest, but on the policy rationales weigh-
ing against the FDA’s regulation:
[P]rohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label
use “paternalistically” interferes with the ability of phy-
sicians and patients to receive potentially relevant treat-
ment information; such barriers to information about off-
label use could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, in-
formed and intelligent treatment decisions.130
128 Id. at 166.
129 Id. at 164.
130 Id. at 166.
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However, as we explain in Part II, the implications of applying strict
scrutiny to this type of regulation—even when semantically applying
Central Hudson—are wide-reaching and threaten to undermine entire
blocks of federal regulation, such as the Securities Act of 1933.  The
theoretical and policy considerations implicated in this issue are complex
and require a fundamental discussion of First Amendment theory in the
context of commercial speech.
Similarly, the Caronia majority’s discussion of the fourth Central
Hudson prong consists of a summary conclusion that “the government’s
construction of the FDCA to impose a complete and criminal ban on off-
label promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers is more extensive than
necessary to achieve the government’s substantial interests.”131  An ana-
lytic discussion of this fourth prong would begin by considering how
precisely this interest should be defined.  Again, prohibiting off-label
marketing by manufacturers is highly likely to lead to a reduction in off-
label usage.  If the governmental interest is promoting patient safety, it is
hard to conceive of anything more necessary to achieve that interest than
a reduction in off-label usage, however slight—and the marketing re-
striction is likely to have more than a slight effect.  Indeed, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that
[t]he Government is not required to employ the least re-
strictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate nar-
row tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted
interest—”a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reason-
able; that represents not necessarily the single best dis-
position but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served.”132
Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between an irrational prohibi-
tion and one that achieves a marginal effect.133  Conceptually, the notion
of “more extensive than necessary” implies that some aspect of the re-
striction is ineffective at achieving the result.  If a marginal effect cannot
be narrowly tailored, then only regulation that succeeds at completely
eliminating the undesired phenomenon would pass.  This is unrealistic
and again shows the majority’s application of a strict scrutiny standard
that seems impossible to meet.  Part II discusses the policy implications
131 Id. at 167.
132 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188
(1999) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
133 Cf. WV Ass’n of Club Owners and Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292,
304–05 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Court has struck down restrictions in cases where the program is
irrational . . . or where there is specific evidence that goes against the claimed linkage.” (citing
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 190; 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 506 & n.17 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995); Eden-
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771–73 (1993))).
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of such a fundamental limitation on the government’s capacity to restrain
commercial speech in light of the theory behind the First Amendment.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Public Interest v. Paternalism in Regulation of Commercial
Speech: Information Dissemination or Protecting Unwary
Consumers?
1. The Theory of Protecting Commercial Speech Under the First
Amendment
Despite appearing deceptively simple, numerous theoretical ques-
tions surrounding commercial speech—what precisely it is, whether it is
entitled to protection under the First Amendment, and what the extent of
such protection should be—are maddeningly complex.  As Robert Post
noted in his famous essay in the UCLA Law Review, “[c]ommercial
speech differs from public discourse because it is constitutionally valued
merely for the information it disseminates, rather than for being itself a
valuable way of participating in democratic self-determination.”134  The
problem, of course, is that it is far from clear how much protection the
dissemination of information should receive.  Post suggests that, as a
starting point, the First Amendment should apply “only when the stream
of information flows among strangers who can be conceived as indepen-
dent and rational,” which implies that “information must be dispersed
under conditions that are constitutive of a public communicative
sphere.”135
This principle permits identifying those cases of “dependence or re-
liance” where commercial speech receives no First Amendment protec-
tion because it will be generally regarded as “‘“linked inextricably” with
the commercial arrangement in which it occurs,’ so that regulation of the
arrangement can also restrict the speech by which the arrangement is
constituted.”136  However, this categorization is less helpful for judging
the appropriateness of a government restraint of protected commercial
speech that is truthful, and particularly the degree of scrutiny courts
should impose.  On this issue, Post suggests that the guiding theory
should be a distinction between truly paternalistic regulation and advanc-
ing the public interest:
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
for example, the government forbade “for sale” signs in
134 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1,
4 (2000).
135 Id. at 24.
136 Id. at 24–25 (footnote omitted) (quoting Edenfield 507 U.S. at 767 (1993)) (quoting
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979))).
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order to prevent the blockbusting of a racially integrated
neighborhood.  The regulation had nothing to do with
the “good” of individual buyers or sellers, but was in-
stead enacted to preserve the possibility of integrating
housing.  The ordinance was not paternalistic . . . .  It did
not regulate the behavior of individuals in order to pro-
tect them from themselves; it sought instead to achieve a
public good.137
While some scholars have suggested that paternalism historically played
little role in the Court’s adjudicatory process,138 it held great importance
in Sorrell139 and was explicitly emphasized by the Second Circuit in
Caronia.140  The fear of paternalism—and a corresponding commitment
to consumer autonomy—seems to underlie this most recent trend of deci-
sions that are chipping away at the intermediate scrutiny standard.141
Scholars have penned a variety of responses to the concern that ex-
cessive paternalism undermines the liberty and autonomy of individual
citizens.  For example, Robert Post takes the view that the normative
superiority of individual autonomy in the context of democracy and the
First Amendment is misplaced: “democracy is not about individual self-
government, but about collective self-determination,” which means that
“[u]nlike various forms of liberalism, democracy does not focus on the
protection of individual autonomy outside of participation within this
137 Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted) (citing Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 87–91 (1997)).
138 E.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Com-
mercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1242 (1988) (“[I]n the absence of any cases involv-
ing truly paternalistic restrictions of the strong type, the Court ought to be taken at its anti-
paternalistic word.”).
139 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011) (“[T]he ‘fear that [con-
sumers] would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify content-based
burdens on speech.” (quoting Thompson v. Western States Medical Ctr, 535 U.S. 357, 374
(2002) and citing Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976))).  The Second Circuit cited this statement in Caronia.  United
States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166, 181 (2d Cir. 2012).
140 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
141 In our view, the ideological opposition to paternalism is the more compelling explana-
tion for the recent case law rather than a genuine belief in the natural efficiency of a market of
free information in the commercial sphere.  The notion that consumers make better-informed
decisions, as an empirical matter, when there are no restrictions on the free flow of information
strains credulity.  One need only look at the success of advertising campaigns for cigarettes
among youth to realize that the truth does not always win in the market of commercial ideas
regarding the desirability of products or services. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 138, at R
1208.  Indeed, the inability of consumers to accurately internalize the economic costs and
benefits in response to lengthy, confusing disclosure and conflicting commercial messages has
been well-documented in the empirical literature. See generally, e.g., Martin J. Eppler &
Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload: A Review of Literature from Organiza-
tion Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related Disciplines, 5 INFO. SOC’Y 325 (2004)
(summarizing the relevant literature across disciplines).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP203.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-APR-14 12:57
2013] SNAKE OIL SALESMEN OR PURVEYORS OF KNOWLEDGE 363
public sphere.”142  Post’s approach implies, then, that paternalism—lim-
iting individual autonomy—is justified if it is necessary to promote the
collective enterprise of democracy.
But this view is far from predominant.  Other scholars emphasize
that American democracy is indeed a liberal democracy, in which indi-
vidual autonomy is a value inherently worthy of normative respect.  Mar-
tin Redish, for example, argues that “speech concerning commercial
products and services can facilitate private self-government in much the
same way that political speech fosters collective self-government,” and
in his view, “[b]oth private and collective self-government are grounded
in identical normative concerns about self-development and self-determi-
nation.”143  It follows from this normative commitment to self-govern-
ment that paternalism is highly problematic.
Unfortunately, neither conception of the role of liberty and individ-
ual autonomy seems entirely compelling.  Post’s emphasis on the collec-
tive nature of democracy seems to beg the question of the normative
value scheme that lies at the heart of the debate over commercial speech.
Whether American democracy should privilege the autonomy of speak-
ers conveying truthful information that is commercial in nature is pre-
cisely the question at issue.  The statement that democracy “is about
collective self-determination” rather than “individual self-government”
seems little more than a conclusory restatement of the normative assump-
tion that individual autonomy is not worthy of protection.  The key ques-
tion, as Redish correctly points out, is why Post’s notion of collective
democracy should be preferred over the alternative of liberalism.144
On the other hand, Redish’s view fails to persuade as well.  Even if
one assumes that private and collective self-government derive from a
common commitment to self-determination, it does not follow that the
legal protection given to both forms of speech should be identical or even
that the ambit of the First Amendment encompass both.  Numerous con-
stitutional doctrines advance abstract normative principles of justice,
equality, and freedom—but they do not receive identical doctrinal pro-
tection, nor do they all fall within the same constitutional provision.  In
that sense, Redish’s argument proves too much: interpreting the First
142 Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 169, 175–76 (2000).
143 Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism, and the Twi-
light Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81 (2007).
144 Id. at 80–81 (“If one were to define ‘commercial speech’ as speech concerning com-
mercial products or services, I suppose one starting from the premise that the First Amendment
is primarily or exclusively designed to protect speech relevant to the political process would
logically conclude that commercial speech is deserving of little or no First Amendment protec-
tion.  I have attacked this view as flawed because it fails to determine the normative reasons
our system would choose democracy in the first place.” (emphasis added)).
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Amendment solely in light of a highly abstract normative commitment to
self-government suggests that nearly any expressive human activity is
entitled to its protection.
It seems that these views can be reconciled, however, by focusing
more tightly on the distinction between paternalism and the provision of
public goods.  It is true that, at the most general level of abstraction,
individual well-being is itself a public good, as suboptimal decisions by
individuals reduce the overall level of welfare in society.  But there is a
distinction between regulating commercial speech solely for the sake of
withholding information from consumers’ cognitive processes and regu-
lating in order to prevent a social externality that would inevitably result
if the truthful—but socially harmful—information were to seep out into
the marketplace and affect consumer behavior.
We discuss the application of this distinction in existing law in the
following subsection, but consider the simple example of regulating dis-
closure in financial transactions.  The recent financial crisis and ensuing
recession demonstrated the tremendous cost to society that resulted, at
least in part, from poor decisions by consumers regarding subprime
mortgages.145  It would be fundamentally inaccurate to characterize
mandatory mortgage disclosure regulation as nothing more than a pater-
nalistic effort to control the information available to homeowners.  Dis-
closures that increase the likelihood individual decisions will be truly
welfare-maximizing benefit society as a whole, not merely the home-
owners who are the direct beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme.  Mort-
gage disclosure is most accurately understood as regulation of
commercial speech that supplies a public good, namely, more efficient
pricing in housing and credit markets.
While helpful, this distinction is still rife with significant ambiguity.
Any given policy is likely to benefit both the recipients of information
and society as a whole.  Of course, nothing in this discussion will yield a
mechanical classification system for commercial speech—the contours
of any legal doctrine ultimately reduce to difficult judgments in border-
line cases.  But the advantage of this definition is that it permits ascribing
a predictable probability of heightened constitutional protection accord-
ing to the degree to which the speech advances clearly defined public
goods rather than the well-being of individual consumers.
145 See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECO-
NOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 67 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (explaining the history of subprime mortgages and how con-
sumers’ poor decisions with them partially led to the recent financial crisis).
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A good example of this predictive power is Educational Media Co.
v. Swecker, discussed previously.146 Swecker was decided several years
after a very similar case in the Third Circuit, Pitt News v. Pappert.147  In
Pitt News, then-Circuit Judge Alito, writing for the majority, struck down
a Pennsylvania law prohibiting advertisement of alcoholic beverages in
media affiliated with educational institutions.148  While the court techni-
cally found that the advertisement failed the third and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson,149 its rationale and justification are telling:
The suggestion that the elimination of alcoholic bever-
age ads from The Pitt News and other publications con-
nected with the University will slacken the demand for
alcohol by Pitt students is counterintuitive and unsup-
ported by any evidence that the Commonwealth has
called to our attention.  Nor has the Commonwealth
pointed to any evidence that the elimination of alcoholic
beverage ads from The Pitt News will make it harder for
would-be purchasers to locate places near campus where
alcoholic beverages may be purchased.150
Viewing this statement through a doctrinal lens might suggest Alito was
merely applying a type of narrow tailoring test within the Central Hud-
son framework.  But as we described previously, the Central Hudson
framework is highly malleable, and what better proof of that than the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Swecker?  But the paternalism v. public
goods distinction sheds great light on these two cases.  The Swecker
court was convinced that prohibiting the advertising would in fact im-
prove public safety.151  The Pitt News court was not.152
Accordingly, despite the Court’s lip service in Sorrell to the content
and speaker-based restriction, it is the probability of contributing to a
public good that has consistently led courts to distinguish justified regu-
lation from unwarranted paternalism.  In Sorrell, the Court simply
seemed unconvinced that the public interest was served by what
amounted to little more than state-sanctioned favoring of generic drug
manufacturers over their name-brand competitors.153  Similarly, in
Caronia, one way to understand the majority’s decision was that it appar-
ently did not believe that prohibition of truthful off-label marketing had a
146 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010).
147 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004).
148 Id. at 101.
149 Id. at 107–08.
150 Id. at 107.
151 Swecker, 602 F.3d at 589.
152 Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 107.
153 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP203.txt unknown Seq: 30 28-APR-14 12:57
366 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:337
substantial benefit to society.  In the following section, we discuss the
benefits of regulating truthful commercial speech more generally, as this
is one of the most hotly contested areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
B. The Benefits of Regulating Truthful Commercial Speech
In the prior section, we discussed the theoretical justification for
regulating commercial speech under the First Amendment and the impli-
cations for democracy and individual autonomy.  In short, the promotion
of the public good is a legitimate rationale whereas mere paternalism
falls short.  Here we discuss three instrumental benefits to society from
restricting truthful commercial speech: (1) the difficulty of distinguishing
truthful from false commercial speech, (2) the indirect benefit of prophy-
lactically regulating truth to ameliorate evidentiary challenges with prov-
ing falsity, and (3) encouraging substantive compliance with a beneficial
regulatory system.  Applying strict scrutiny to the regulation of truthful
speech would deprive society of these benefits, which are given concrete
expression in numerous areas of law.
1. Difficulty of Distinguishing Truthful from Misleading
Commercial Speech
A primary benefit of regulating truthful commercial speech is that it
is often difficult to distinguish between truth and misleading falsehood.
In Robert Post’s words, “putting aside outright false communications, the
difficulties of identifying misleading statements seem as formidable in
the area of commercial speech as in the arena of public discourse.”154
He points to the Court’s statement in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, that “distinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in
virtually any field of commerce may require resolution of exceedingly
complex and technical factual issues and the consideration of nice ques-
tions of semantics.”155  In a classic article, Judge Alex Kozinski and Stu-
art Banner give a powerful illustration of the conceptual challenge of
identifying misleading commercial speech:
What about a television commercial that shows a man
using a particular brand of deodorant and, as an apparent
result, leading a much more vigorous social life?  How
could we ascertain the truth of that commercial?  Does it
even have a truth?  It is intended to plant the suggestion
in the minds of consumers that this deodorant is a desira-
ble product, but surely a purchaser cannot claim to have
154 Post, supra note 134, at 37.
155 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985).
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been defrauded when he fails to acquire a new group of
friends.156
The problem is that the nature of the advertising message is not verifiable
fact.  However, the effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug for treating a
particular condition is a matter of fact.  What is the barrier to holding
such commercial speech to a standard of objective falsity?
We suggest that, while the uses of a drug are more factual than the
example Kozinski and Banner give, the core problem is that the effec-
tiveness and safety of such uses is not always empirically verified.  De-
termining the truthfulness of a statement that “drug X is suitable for
condition Y” requires conducting complex scientific studies and evaluat-
ing empirical evidence.  The inability to instantly verify the ex ante accu-
racy of every claim regarding a drug’s usage justifies the regulation of
(potentially) truthful statements.
In other words, we agree with the premise of Kozinski and Banner’s
argument: it is often difficult to discern whether commercial speech is
truthful.  But while they argue that these expressive examples demon-
strate the need for non-regulation akin to that of political speech,157 we
suggest that just the opposite is true with respect to pharmaceutical drug
marketing.  More generally, when the problem of regulating commercial
speech lies not in the objectivity of the statements but rather in the practi-
cal capability to empirically verify their truthfulness, prophylactic regu-
lation of potentially truthful statements is justified.  This is because such
regulation has a clear benefit—preventing the emergence of potentially
misleading claims—rather than clamping down on expressive speech
that has no factual nature as in Kozinski and Banner’s example.
Another way to see the factual nature and corresponding benefits of
prophylactically regulating statements regarding drug effectiveness is to
consider the injury that would result from the lack of regulation.  With
many examples of commercial speech—such as advertising common
consumer products—the potential injury that would result, in expected
value terms, from misleading communication is likely to be small.  We
could imagine a probability distribution of harm, which would reflect the
amount of harm multiplied by its ex ante likelihood of occurring.  With
common consumer products, even if this curve had a long tail—i.e., there
exists some extremely low probability that a consumer will suffer serious
harm—it is reasonable to assume that the mean of the distribution would
lie at a low level of expected injury.
156 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627, 635 (1990).
157 Id. at 636–38.
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With pharmaceutical drugs, however, this distribution would appear
markedly different.  The harm that could result from misusing a drug
would be greater both in magnitude and probability.  The magnitude of
the injury would be much greater because of the potential powerful ef-
fects of pharmaceutical products on the physical body.  Similarly, the
probability of harm would also be greater because, unlike most consumer
products, misuse of a pharmaceutical product is likely to harm the major-
ity of users (even if it benefits some), whereas many ordinary products
pose little to no risk of injury.  We are not suggesting that regulators
consider only the potential harms of pharmaceutical drugs—indeed,
many have substantial net benefit to society—but rather that the costs of
misleading marketing in this context are fundamentally different from
those of the traditional consumer products that Kozinski and Banner
identify.
Indeed, statements regarding the effectiveness and safety of drugs
are deeply factual in nature rather than being matters of subjective opin-
ion, such as whether using a particular deodorant will make one happy in
life.  Inaccuracy regarding drug effectiveness and safety has substantial
costs, while inaccuracy regarding the benefits of deodorant exacts a com-
paratively small price.  The challenge with regulating off-label marketing
of pharmaceuticals lies in the inability to instantly verify the accuracy of
factual claims regarding safety and effectiveness, not whether lack of
regulation would exact a high price.  Accordingly, the key question is
whether the benefits of regulating truthful speech outweigh the costs of
preventing drugs from reaching the market under these conditions of fac-
tual uncertainty.  There might be situations in which the empirical safety
or effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug has been objectively verified
by scientific research.  Regulating truthful speech may still be justified
under the theory that requiring regulatory preapproval ameliorates evi-
dentiary challenges with proving false speech, as the next subsection
explains.
2. Ameliorating Evidentiary Challenges with Proving Falsehood
Even if the truthful nature of the commercial speech is indisputa-
ble—e.g., established by reputable scientific research—there may still be
societal benefits to prohibiting such speech if there is a high probability
that it will be accompanied by false statements that are difficult to prove.
With advertising in general, if the line between truthful puffery and mis-
leading exaggeration is conceptually tenuous, it seems likely that many
advertisers would cross this line in either direction.  In the case of verifi-
able factual claims, such as the effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug,
the legitimate fear of crossing the line might manifest as reliance on
questionable studies or other tainted data.
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A second justification, therefore, for prohibiting truthful off-label
marketing can be found in the concern that putatively truthful statements
are accompanied by untrue exaggerations or inferences in practice.  In
Caronia, for example, Mr. Caronia claimed that while Xyrem was ap-
proved for narcolepsy, “because of the properties that . . . it has it’s going
to insomnia, Fibromyalgia[,] periodic leg movement, restless leg, ahh
also looking at ahh Parkinson’s and . . . other sleep disorders are under-
way such as MS.”158  Whether Xyrem is safe or effective for these uses
is likely to be a mix of truth and falsehood.  In 2010, the FDA rejected
Xyrem’s request for approval as a treatment for fibromyalgia and insom-
nia, finding that it had no effect on sleep but did reduce pain, yet none-
theless concluding that the abuse and dependency risks of using it for
fibromyalgia outweighed the benefit.159  Accordingly, prohibiting
Caronia’s truthful speech about fibromyalgia would prophylactically ex-
tend to the false speech about insomnia.
There are likely numerous instances of off-label marketing such as
this, where the defining characteristic of the speech is not whether it can
be proven truthful but rather the conveyance of falsity (by commission or
omission) in a manner that is difficult to prove.  Challenges of proof may
result from intertwining truth and falsity, such that it is difficult to isolate
and extract the false portion of the speech.  Similarly, proof may be diffi-
cult when the underlying scientific studies are ambiguous or contradic-
tory—an agent might be relying on one outlier study while the body of
scientific evidence goes the other way.  The government simply might
not find it worth the expense to pursue prosecution in these types of
situations.  A regulatory prohibition on all forms of off-label marketing
thus encompasses cases in which falsity is distributed in circumstances
where ex post proof would be difficult.
Indeed, a similar rationale appears elsewhere in the law.  As we
discuss in Part II.C, securities regulation provides a useful analogical
framework to guiding the development of FDA rules on off-label market-
ing.  A classic challenge in the securities laws is how to address forward-
looking or optimistic statements.  As these types of statements concern
the future, they lack a present state of truth or falsehood but will either be
accurate or inaccurate at a future date.  This is analogous to intertwining
truth and falsehood in communication such as in Caronia, except that the
mix is temporal in nature: speech will become true or false as time un-
folds.  In Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., the D.C. Circuit held
that “projections and statements of optimism are false and misleading for
158 U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2012).
159 Matt McMillen, FDA Panel Rejects Xyrem as Fibromyalgia Treatment, WEBMD
(Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.webmd.com/fibromyalgia/news/20100820/fda-panel-rejects-xy
rem-as-fibromyalgia-treatment.
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the purposes of the securities laws if they were issued without good faith
or lacked a reasonable basis when made.”160
The reasonable basis standard, therefore, serves to restrain puta-
tively non-false speech when it is made in order to ameliorate the chal-
lenge of discerning which speech is likely to become false over time.
Subjecting commercial speech that is not presently false to the reasona-
ble basis restraint is justified under the rationale that determining which
projections or optimistic statements are likely to be false is extraordina-
rily difficult.  Such a justification applies with equal force to FDA regu-
lation of off-label marketing: requiring preapproval for marketing for any
uses would ameliorate the challenges (in the counterfactual universe of
no preapproval) with demonstrating in ex post litigation that statements
regarding certain uses are categorically false.
3. Encouraging Substantive Compliance with a Regulatory
System
Finally, restricting truthful commercial speech can bring society the
benefits of increased compliance with the substantive requirements of a
regulatory system.  Speech that encourages bypassing the protections
provided by regulation may increase the prevalence of socially detrimen-
tal activities that the governmental scheme seeks to prevent.  For exam-
ple, off-label marketing facilitates the increased use of pharmaceutical
drugs for purposes that have not undergone FDA testing and approval.
As off-label uses are likely, on average, to be less safe than approved
uses—despite providing additional treatment—the FDA prohibition on
promoting off-label use brings society the benefits of increased safety as
a result of greater compliance with the FDA approval process.
However, as this example demonstrates, increased substantive com-
pliance with a regulatory regime does not necessarily imply an increased
societal benefit.  The safety benefits of requiring relatively more FDA
approvals may be outweighed by the cost of depriving patients of poten-
tially life-saving treatments.  But even if on average the substantive costs
of increased compliance exceed its benefits, a regulatory regime provides
an independent benefit by reducing the variance of potential outcomes.
As humans tend to be risk-averse, holding all else equal, society might
prefer a state of affairs where the risk/reward spread is narrower.  With-
out off-label uses, fewer patients might recover from life-threatening ill-
160 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Isquith v. Middle South Utils., Inc., 847
F.2d 186, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, at 371
(3d Cir. 1993); Roots P’ship v. Lands’ End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992); Sinay v.
Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Bruce A. Hiler, The
SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and
Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1123 (1987).
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nesses, but it is also true that fewer will die from unexpected side effects
of mislabeled drugs.  An example of a social acceptance of this principle
is found in the largely accepted ethical norm that affirmatively taking life
is more morally blameworthy than failing to save life when one’s own
life might be at risk.161  Society recognizes the difference between obli-
gating individuals not to affirmatively harm others—a matter of cer-
tainty—and intervening in conditions of uncertainty, even if, on average,
such interventions would lead to a reduction in the loss of life.  Prefer-
ring safety to risky reward by reducing the variance of outcomes is a
legitimate social interest, even if the costs exceed the benefits on
average.
In addition to reducing risky outcomes, other values are arguably
worthy of substantive protection through a regulatory regime.  As noted
in the prior subsection, the definition of false and misleading commercial
speech includes promoting outcomes for which one lacks a reasonable
basis in fact.162  A prohibition on truthful commercial speech such as off-
label marketing can go one step further and encourage a level of care
beyond merely a reasonable basis.  Indeed, even if reasonable basis is the
desired substantive standard, a prohibition on speech lacking regulatory
approval can reduce the subjectivity inherent in such a determination,
giving speakers greater confidence that speech will not be found false ex
post.  This is related to the previous point on variance of outcomes: sub-
stantive compliance has independent value linked to the certainty and
risk-reducing benefits of obtaining regulatory approval.
Regardless of the normative tradeoff of risk versus reward, it seems
that increasing substantive compliance with a regulatory regime plausi-
bly provides a benefit that is at least worthy of constitutional protection.
If our democratically elected legislature has opted to subject market
transactions to regulatory approval—either directly or by delegating au-
thority to a regulatory body—incentivizing the substantive benefits that
result from increasing compliance with this regime arguably justifies a
restraint on truthful commercial speech, even if those benefits remain
limited to reducing uncertain outcomes.
Indeed, one area in which the benefits of encouraging substantive
compliance are particularly evident is compelled speech.  As Jennifer
Pomeranz points out in a recent article on the implications of Sorrell,
numerous regulatory regimes impose mandatory disclosure require-
ments.163  Specific examples include the securities laws, discussed at
length in the next section, as well as nutrition labeling, allergen labeling,
161 This norm underlies the general rule that there is no duty to rescue at the common law.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
162 Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
163 Pomeranz, supra note 3, at 403. R
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and tobacco labeling.164  Mandatory disclosure improves efficiency and
fairness by reducing misallocation of resources and ensuring that con-
sumers have access to essential information regarding products and ser-
vices regardless of socioeconomic status or other private means of
obtaining information.  The compulsion of commercial speech, therefore,
directly furthers these societal goals.
C. The Securities Act of 1933 as an Analogous Regulatory Scheme
The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) provides a useful
analogy to FDA regulation of off-label marketing for two reasons.  First,
its constitutionality is suspect under a literal reading of Caronia, as its
restriction on making offers of securities is both “content-based”—ap-
plying solely to securities transactions—and “speaker-based”—applying
to certain types of issuers and not others.  The Securities Act thus pro-
vides a useful reductio ad absurdum demonstration of the weakness of
the majority’s reasoning in Caronia.  Second, the Securities Act consti-
tutes an informative example of how to balance the tension between pa-
ternalism and the public good in the context of speech regulation.  The
specific policies it employs can serve as useful analogies to reform the
FDA’s policy regarding the off-label marketing of pharmaceutical drugs.
1. Regulating Speech Independent of Transactions: Section 5
and Exemptions to the Registration Requirement
A fundamental characteristic of the regulatory scheme established
by the Securities Act is its regulation of speech regarding investment
activity and not merely the transactions constituting such activity.  Sec-
tion 5(c) of the Securities Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
to make use of any means or instruments of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or
medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, un-
less a registration statement has been filed as to such se-
curity, or while the registration statement is the subject
of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective
date of the registration statement) any public proceeding
or examination under section 77h of this title.165
Section 5(c) therefore prohibits offers to buy or sell securities unless a
registration statement has been filed in accordance with the statute.  Two
parallel provisions, section 5(a) and 5(b), prohibit the sale of a security
164 Id. at 405–06.
165 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
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until a registration statement has been declared effective, as well as the
sale of a security without an attached prospectus that conforms to the
statutory requirement.166
Section 7 of the Securities Act specifies the required contents of a
registration statement,167 which includes elements such as the names of
beneficial owners, a list of material contracts, and financial state-
ments.168  Section 10 provides that a prospectus must contain a subset of
the elements that are required to be filed with the registration state-
ment.169  To ensure compliance with these requirements, sections 11 and
12(a)(2) establish private causes of action for injured investors to sue for
false or misleading statements in the registration statement or prospectus,
respectfully.170  Section 12(a)(1) also grants purchasers a right of rescis-
sion if the securities were sold in violation of section 5.171
The net effect of the section 5 regulatory scheme is to prohibit of-
fers—communications regarding the sale of securities—until the statu-
tory requirements for a valid registration statement and prospectus have
been satisfied.  Indeed, the term “offer” is defined very broadly by the
statute as including “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value,”172 and as
such is plainly not restricted to the common-law definition of “offer.”173
While the statute excludes “preliminary negotiations” and agreements
between issuers and underwriters,174 the prohibition on offers sweeps
very broadly and encompasses “the publication of information and state-
ments, and publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed
financing” even if “not couched in terms of an express offer” as long as
they “contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public inter-
est in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which raises
a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling
effort.”175
166 Id. § 77e(a), 77e(b).
167 Id. § 77g.
168 Id. § 77aa sched. A.
169 Id. § 77j.
170 Id. § 77k, 77l(a)(2).
171 See id. § 77k.
172 Id. § 77b(3).
173 See, e.g., Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 (2d. Cir. 1971); SEC v.
Cavanagh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 337, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
174 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
175 Statement of Commission Relating to Publication of Information Prior to or After
Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 33-3844, 22 Fed. Reg.
8359 (Oct. 8, 1957); see also Offers and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers,
Securities Act Release No. 33-4697, 29 Fed. Reg. 7317 (May 28, 1964); Publication of Infor-
mation Prior to or After Filing and Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act
Release No. 33-5009, 34 Fed. Reg. 16,870 (Oct. 7, 1969); Guidelines for Release of Informa-
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However, the statute defines several exemptions to the registration
requirement.  As we explain in the following subsection, these serve to
illuminate many of the underlying purposes of the Securities Act and
reflect the fundamental distinction between paternalism and the provision
of public goods.  Analogies to these exemptions can guide the develop-
ment of a more effective FDA regulatory policy with respect to off-label
marketing.
The most commonly utilized exemptions involving securities are
found in section 4(a)(2) and Regulation D of the Securities Act.  Section
4(a)(2) provides that the provisions of section 5 do not apply to “transac-
tions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”176  While this is a
highly fact-intensive inquiry, in Securities Act Release No. 4552 the SEC
defined a series of factors which are used to determine whether a transac-
tion does not involve a public offering, including the number of offerees,
the size of the offering, public versus private advertising of the offering,
whether the purchasers are acquiring the securities for investment pur-
poses rather than resale, and the period of retention.177  In 2010, the
ABA Section of Business Law Committee on the Federal Regulation of
Securities summarized the following four factors for the section 4(a)(2)
exemption: (1) manner of offering, (2) eligibility of the purchasers, (3)
information, and (4) resales.178  In short, these various formulations of
the private placement exemption under section 4(a)(2) reflect the notion
that reduced disclosure is permitted for offerings made to a certain group
of purchasers, one that is restricted and “non-public” in nature.
A similar policy underlies the exemptions under Regulation D.
Regulation D contains three exemptions under Rules 504, 505, and
506.179  The technical requirements for each are complex but, in short,
Rule 504 applies to offerings by non-reporting companies with an aggre-
gate offering price of $1 million per year or less.180  Rule 505 applies to
offerings by any company with an aggregate offering price of $5 million
per year or less but, crucially, the offering may only be made to so-called
“accredited investors” and up to thirty-five non-accredited investors.181
The definition of “accredited investor” is complex but includes corpora-
tion by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, 36
Fed. Reg. 16,506 (Aug. 16, 1971).
176 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
177 Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg.
11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962).
178 Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Law of Private Place-
ments (Non-Public Offerings) Not Entitled to Benefits of Safe Harbors—A Report, 66 BUS.
LAW. 85, 93 (2010).
179 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–.506 (2013).
180 Id. § 230.504.
181 Id. §§ 230.505, 230.501(a).
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tions with assets exceeding $5 million and individuals with a net worth
exceeding $1 million.182
Rule 506 is not an independent exemption but provides a safe har-
bor under section 4(a)(2) for any size offering with accredited investor
restrictions similar to Rule 505.  However, the thirty-five non-accredited
investors must be sophisticated investors, i.e., having “such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that [the purchaser] is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment,
or the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale
that such purchaser comes within this description.”183  Accordingly, the
exemptions and safe harbors provided by Regulation D seek to accom-
plish similar goals as section 4(a)(2), namely permitting non-restricted
communications regarding investment transactions to a restricted audi-
ence of non-public, sophisticated, or “accredited” investors.
2. The Constitutionality of Regulating Offers Under the
Securities Act of 1933
The only Supreme Court case in which certiorari was putatively
granted to resolve the question of the constitutionality of restrictions on
communications under the securities laws was Lowe v. SEC.184  How-
ever, the Lowe Court found that the statute did not prohibit the communi-
cation at issue and thus elected not to opine on the First Amendment
issue.185  Indeed, lower courts have repeatedly rejected constitutional
challenges to the securities laws on First Amendment grounds.186  It
seems that, as a matter of doctrinal law, the dominant view is that the
restrictions on commercial speech regarding investment transactions
found in the Securities Act and related statutes are constitutional.
Scholars have varying views on this issue.  Some have argued that
courts’ refusals to seriously consider the constitutional implications of
restricting offers of securities plainly contradicts the commercial speech
doctrine as developed in Central Hudson and subsequent case law.187
182 Id. § 230.501(a).
183 Id. § 230.506(b)(ii).
184 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
185 Id. at 210.
186 E.g., SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also R
& W Technical Servs. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 205 F.3d 165, 174–76 (5th
Cir. 2000) (refusing to extend Lowe to apply to the Commodities Exchange Act).
187 E.g., Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L.
REV. 223, 225–26 (1990); Donald E. Lively, Securities Regulation and Freedom of the Press:
Toward a Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 847
(1985); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 6–9 (1989); Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restric-
tions on Advertising of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 41 BUS. LAW. 377, 386
(1986).  Some practitioners sounded a similar view in the wake of Lowe. E.g., James C.
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These scholars would likely point to Caronia and Sorrell as examples of
courts properly engaging with the constitutional issues implicated by re-
stricting commercial speech in the pharmaceutical contexts.  Others have
suggested that securities regulation—like antitrust and other areas of eco-
nomic regulation—simply falls outside the scope of the First Amend-
ment,188 but these views are difficult to reconcile with these two recent
cases.
Yet it is possible to take a more balanced approach that reflects the
theory of the First Amendment developed above and does not contradict
the underlying policy rationale in Sorrell.  In the context of securities
regulation, the paternalism versus public good distinction is particularly
compelling: deceptive communication is likely to further the misalloca-
tion of capital, the prevention of which is not merely a paternalistic inter-
vention to protect individuals from the adverse consequences of poor
decision-making.  Rather, promoting an efficient allocation of investment
capital improves overall social welfare.  Society as a whole benefits
when firms are selected for investment based on true profitability, rather
than false pretenses.  The efficient flow of capital promotes employment
and consumer and producer welfare by encouraging competitive market
pricing.  Society has a strong interest in preventing fraud, deception, and
misleading statements from distorting the investment analysis.189
The absence of a purely paternalistic motive—and the correspond-
ing presence of a compelling public good—explains the general resis-
tance to invalidating the securities laws under the commercial speech
doctrine.  But this theory can also shed light on the specific doctrines and
exemptions articulated in the prior subsection.  Take, for example, the
“accredited investor” definition.  The requirement of a minimum net
worth functions as a proxy for access to investment advisors and the
negotiating leverage to compel the necessary disclosure that would pre-
vent a misallocation of capital.
This is another persuasive example of the absence of a paternalistic
motive in the securities laws: misleading disclosure may just as easily
harm high net-worth investors.  Indeed, some have argued that the notion
of an accredited investor is flawed for this very reason: highly intelligent
recent graduates of finance programs are likely more capable of prevent-
ing harm to themselves than wealthy but ignorant individuals.190  But
Goodale, The First Amendment and the Securities Act: A Collision Course?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 8,
1983, at 1.
188 E.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Ex-
ploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004).
189 This explanation, however, does not account for why, in the quest to promote alloca-
tive efficiency, government intervention is relatively superior to market self-discipline.
190 E.g., Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited
Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009).
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this paternalistic approach is precisely what the Court has resisted
throughout the development of its First Amendment jurisprudence.
When viewed through the lens of furthering the public good of allocative
efficiency, negotiating leverage—not financial know-how—is much
more likely to compel counterparty disclosure and ensure that resources
are properly allocated throughout society.  Negotiating leverage, of
course, is largely determined by financial resources, suggesting that Reg-
ulation D’s accredited investor definition constitutionally reflects a pub-
lic good rather than paternalistic motive.
The more general statutory exemption in section 4(a)(2) seems more
problematic to justify under this rationale because of the Court’s state-
ment in the seminal case interpreting section 4(a)(2), SEC v. Ralston
Purina Corp.: “An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering.’”191  Such
a statement has a strong paternalistic ring, but the Court’s commercial
speech jurisprudence has evolved over time. Ralston Purina was de-
cided in 1953—over twenty years before Virginia Pharmacy,192 the first
major commercial speech case that eventually led to Central Hudson.  It
is likely that justification seemed constitutional at that time, which was
well before the courts rejected certain paternalistic regulation of com-
mercial speech.  Moreover, the notion of “fend[ing] for themselves”
could refer not necessarily to a paternalistic self-protection rationale, but
rather to the public benefit of informed investment which leads to greater
allocative efficiency.  The line between the two is razor-thin, but there is
a fundamental difference between restricting speech to protect individu-
als for their own sake and protecting individuals for the sake of others.
Ensuring that participants in a market are fully informed, even if they
would prefer not to be, can be justified under the latter rationale without
necessarily having a paternalistic nature.
3. Analogous Principles for FDA Regulation
The principles behind the restriction on offers and exemptions in the
securities laws can inform the development of a more nuanced approach
to regulating the off-label marketing of prescription drugs.  In the next
Part, we present detailed proposals for reforming the FDA regulations,
but it is worth first examining how the aforementioned rules of securities
regulation strike a careful balance between restricting speech to promote
the public good and upholding autonomy and liberty by permitting the
free flow of information.
191 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (emphasis added).
192 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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As a starting point, there are many similarities between the section 5
prohibition on offers for the sale of securities and the FDCA’s require-
ment of FDA approval prior to marketing pharmaceutical drugs.  Both
restrict communication regarding a transaction in addition to regulating
the substantive transaction itself, and both give administrative agencies
the discretion to permit such communication under certain conditions.  In
short, both regimes constitute powerful restraints on commercial speech.
The underlying rationales of the two regimes are similar as well.
Section 5 seeks to protect unwary purchasers from buying securities
based on inadequate information,193 above and beyond the prohibition on
fraud—i.e., false or misleading statements—that would apply under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or at the common law.  Similarly, as
described previously, FDA preapproval developed out of a similar recog-
nition that ex post liability for misleading promotion of pharmaceuticals
was insufficient to protect society from the harmful consequences of the
proliferation of unsafe drugs.194  The recognition of a need to restrain
communication until regulatory approval may be obtained derived in
both contexts from an understanding that courts and ex post litigation are
insufficiently competent in institutional terms to provide an adequate
level of protection for consumers and investors.
Despite these similarities, there is a crucial difference that is essen-
tial to understanding the limits of drawing analogies between the two
regimes.  The section 5 preapproval process is limited to ensuring ade-
quate disclosure, which includes the list of required elements found in
section 7 of the Securities Act.195  A fundamental principle of federal
securities regulation is the lack of substantive review by the SEC regard-
ing the value of the investment opportunity.196  On the other hand, FDA
review is fundamentally substantive in nature: the agency is tasked with
ensuring not only adequate disclosure—i.e., sufficiently detailed label-
ing—but also that the safety and effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug
justifies its marketing and sale to the public.  Moreover, as we have dis-
cussed throughout this Article, this substantive review is conducted with
regard to specific uses—the question of off-label marketing arises not
with respect to drugs that have never received FDA approval for any use,
193 See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (“The primary purpose of the
Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of material information thought
necessary to allow them to make informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of
securities in interstate commerce.” (citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124
(1953))).
194 See Janssen, supra note 72, at 429. R
195 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006).
196 For a summary and critique of the disclosure-centric approach to U.S. securities regu-
lation, see generally Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139 (2006).
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but rather with respect to a particular use that has not (yet) been
approved.
Because drugs are inherently dangerous products,197 there is always
the need to balance the risk of adverse effects with the benefits of treat-
ment.  That is why the FDA may approve a drug for one indication and
not for another.  In addition, a drug is deemed defective unless proper
warnings are given.  As a result, both the intended use and the labeling
are integral to the product being sold.  Thus, the mandatory labeling is
distinguishable from both the liquor price advertising at issue in 44 Li-
quormart and the advertising of compounded drugs at issue in Western
States Medical (because the Western States pharmacist was mixing pre-
approved active ingredients and not promoting unapproved uses).  In-
stead, requiring the proper label on a drug is more akin to requiring that
liquor bottles be labeled with the correct volume and proof.
The substantive nature of FDA review means that it is far more
sweeping and restrictive than the SEC’s check for adequacy of disclo-
sure.  It is only natural to conclude that there are likely to be constitu-
tional implications to the differing degrees of the restraint on commercial
speech between these two regimes.  We are not suggesting that the FDA
preapproval requirement is unconstitutional, but rather pointing out that
the different degrees of severity of restraint on speech has First Amend-
ment implications and should therefore inform the development of a
more nuanced doctrine.  In particular, it seems at least presumptively jus-
tified to construe exemptions to the FDA preapproval process more
broadly than their Securities Act counterparts because the former play a
more important role in protecting speech than the latter.
Indeed, the two exemptions to the SEC registration requirement pro-
vide useful guidance for construing a more balanced approach to FDA
regulation of off-label marketing.  As we emphasized in the prior subsec-
tion, both Regulation D and section 4(a)(2) are consistent with an under-
lying rationale of promoting allocative efficiency—the conditions for
utilizing these exemptions reflect an assumption that investors in these
circumstances will be capable of eliciting the truth necessary to make an
informed and accurate investment decision.  The analogy to FDA regula-
tion lies in this truth-discovery function: if one were to consider exemp-
tions to the prohibition on off-label marketing, just as with the Securities
Act they should be justified under a theory that the specific conditions
for obtaining such exemptions are likely to ensure that truth will be suffi-
ciently ascertained to promote an efficient allocation of the benefits and
risks of pharmaceutical products.  The twin notions of truthful facts and
197 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (providing for strict liability for
“carr[ying] on an abnormally dangerous activity”).
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the ability to properly ascertain those facts are highly analogous to the
policies underlying Regulation D and section 4(a)(2).
In particular, consider the accredited and sophisticated investor re-
quirements for utilizing the Rule 504, 505, or 506 exemptions under
Regulation D.  The underlying theory is that investors with these finan-
cial resources are capable of compelling disclosure through bilateral bar-
gaining because of the strength of their balance sheets.  Put differently,
economic resources serve as a proxy for the probability of obtaining and
ascertaining the truth in a bilateral manner, i.e., without compulsory dis-
closure.  In the FDA context, one might analogously point to the scien-
tific knowledge that medical professionals hold as an effective proxy for
the probability that the truthful content of information regarding the off-
label effectiveness of a drug will accurately be ascertained.  The exis-
tence of preexisting scientific knowledge can be thought of as rendering
a doctor an “accredited consumer of information” who is capable of dis-
tinguishing between truthful data regarding the effectiveness of a particu-
lar drug from the mere puffery that would lead unsophisticated
consumers astray.  We return to this point in Part III when discussing our
proposal to permit the distribution of independent scientific studies to
physicians.
In a similar manner, the Security Act’s more general section 4(a)(2)
private placement doctrine can be understood as recognizing the danger
of widespread public disclosure of potentially misleading information,
even if it contains partial truth.  This goes beyond the sophistication of
individual consumers of information to the size of the audience to which
the speech is directed. The conditions for qualifying for the section
4(a)(2) exemption reflect an understanding that the social cost of wide-
spread marketing of potentially misleading information is likely to ex-
ceed the benefits of the dissemination of truth.  Applying this rationale to
FDA regulation suggests that a more nuanced framework might distin-
guish between different forms of off-label marketing according to the
size of the audience.  Marketing directly to the public might be more
worthy of an absolute prohibition than off-label usage information “pri-
vately placed” among a smaller group.  In short, a comprehensive reform
to FDA regulation of off-label marketing should consider both the infor-
mational competency of the audience as well as its size—both of these
factors contribute to the likelihood that a commercial speech is likely to
impose a cost on society, justifying a restraint under a public good theory
rather than mere paternalism.
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III. REFORMING THE FDA RULES ON OFF-LABEL MARKETING
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
A. The Food and Drug Administration’s 2011 Draft Guidance for
Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information
In December 2011, the FDA published the Guidance for Industry:
Responding to Unsolicited Requests for Off-Label Information About
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices draft (“2011 Draft Gui-
dance”)198 in response to a citizen petition filed in July of 2011 seeking
clarification on permissible off-label promotions.199  The FDA defined
an “unsolicited request” as one “initiated by persons or entities that are
completely independent of the relevant firm.”200  Responses to these un-
solicited requests comprise two categories—”requests made directly and
privately to firms and requests made in public forums, including through
emerging electronic media.”201
In introducing the subject, the FDA explained the rationale for loos-
ening the absolute prohibition on distributing off-label information by
manufacturers to the general public:
FDA recognizes that firms are capable of responding to
requests about their own named products in a truthful,
non-misleading, and accurate manner.  Furthermore, as
these firms are regulated by FDA and have robust and
current information about their products, FDA recog-
nizes that it can be in the best interest of public health
for a firm to respond to unsolicited requests for informa-
tion about off-label uses of the firm’s products that are
addressed to a public forum, as other participants in the
forum who offer responses may not provide or have ac-
cess to the most accurate and up-to-date information
about the firm’s products.202
The 2011 Draft Guidance reassures firms that if they respond to unsolic-
ited requests for off-label drug information as outlined within the docu-
ment, the “FDA does not intend to use such responses as evidence of the
198 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16.
199 Allergan, Inc., et al., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2011-P-0512 (July 5, 2011),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-P-0512-0001 (sub-
mitted on behalf of certain member companies of the Medical Information Working Group
(MIWG), a working group comprising major manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical
devices); see also “FDA Pressed to Clarify Permissible Formulary, Clinical Guideline Com-
munications,” The Pink Sheet Daily (July 5, 2011), http://www.biopharmatoday.com/2011/07/
fda-pressed-to-clarify-permissible-formulary-clinical-guideline-communications.html.
200 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 4.
201 Id. at 3.
202 Id.
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firm’s intent that the product be used for an unapproved or uncleared
use.”203  Although this reassurance applies only to the FDA, not necessa-
rily to the Department of Justice, one would expect the Justice Depart-
ment to give considerable deference to the FDA on this issue.  The 2011
Draft Guidance provides no protection for solicited requests, a point to
which we return in Part III.B.
In order to enjoy the benefit of the FDA’s proposed safe harbor for
responses to nonpublic, unsolicited requests for off-label information, the
information provided by the pharmaceutical company must be (a) pro-
vided directly in a private, one-on-one communication with the individ-
ual making the request, (b) tailored to answer only the specific questions
asked; (c) truthful, non-misleading, accurate, and balanced, (d) scientific
in nature, and (e) generated by medical or scientific personnel indepen-
dent from sales or marketing departments.204
Information distributed in response to an unsolicited request should
be accompanied by: (a) a copy of the FDA-required labeling, if any, for
the product (e.g., FDA-approved package insert and, if the response is
for a consumer, FDA-approved patient labeling), (b) a prominent state-
ment that (i) notifies the recipient that the FDA has not approved or
cleared the product for the off-label use and discloses the indications for
which FDA has approved or cleared the product and (ii) provides all
important safety information including, if applicable, any boxed warning
for the product, and (c) a complete list of references for all of the infor-
mation disseminated in the response (e.g., a bibliography of publications
in peer-reviewed medical journals or in medical or scientific texts; cita-
tions for data on file, for summary documents, or for abstracts).205  Addi-
tionally, a firm should maintain records of (a) the nature of the request
for information, including the name, address, and affiliation of the re-
203 Id. at 9.  However, the distinction between disseminating off-label information in a
promotional versus educational capacity is not always clear. See VANESSA K. BURROWS &
KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40458, FDA GUIDANCE REGARDING THE
PROMOTION OF OFF-LABEL USES OF DRUGS: LEGAL ISSUES (2009).  Also note that, unlike the
tack taken by the prosecution in the closing arguments to the jury in Caronia, which equated
mere speech with the crime of intending to sell drugs for non-approved uses, the 2011 Draft
Guidance makes clear that mere speech is not illegal per se, but only problematic when it can
be construed as evidence of intent to introduce misbranded and unapproved drugs into inter-
state commerce.  This may be one reason why the government did not seek an en banc review
of the Second Circuit panel’s decision in Caronia, preferring to defend its stance in a case
where both the jury instructions and the government’s arguments made this distinction more
clear.
204 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 7–8.  The material in this and the following
paragraphs is excerpted from the FDA’s guidelines without quotations because of the presence
of numerous technical terms of art.
205 Id. at 9.
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questor, (b) records regarding the information provided to the requestor,
and (c) any follow-up inquiries or questions from the requestor.206
To fall within the FDA’s proposed safe harbor for responses to pub-
lic, unsolicited requests for off-label information, the pharmaceutical
firm must meet several requirements.  First, the firm should respond only
when the request pertains specifically to its own named product (and is
not solely about a competitor’s product).  Second, a firm’s public re-
sponse to public unsolicited requests for off-label information about its
named product should be limited to providing the firm’s contact informa-
tion and should not include any off-label information.207  Instead, the
firm’s public response should (1) indicate that the question pertains to an
unapproved or uncleared use of the product, (2) state that individuals can
contact the medical/scientific representative or medical affairs depart-
ment with the specific unsolicited request to obtain more information,
and (3) provide specific contact information for the medical or scientific
personnel or department (e.g., e-mail address, telephone number, facsim-
ile) so that individuals can follow up independently with the firm to ob-
tain specific information about the off-label use of the product through a
non-public, one-on-one communication.  Third, representatives who pro-
vide public responses to unsolicited requests for off-label information
should clearly disclose their involvement with a particular firm.  Fourth,
responses to public unsolicited requests for off-label information should
not be promotional in nature or tone.208
In our view, there are aspects of the FDA’s proposed safe harbor
that provide a good starting point for beneficial reform of the off-label
marketing rules, but they are woefully incomplete.  Most pointedly, the
rationale behind the public/nonpublic dichotomy seems questionable.
The central underlying public policy concern is balancing the societal
benefit of the dissemination of truthful information into the marketplace
with or without the benefits of FDA indication preapproval, not whether
a request for information on off-label use made to a pharmaceutical com-
pany was publicly disclosed or not.  Put differently, the costs and bene-
fits of off-label information dissemination seem to have less connection
to the public nature of the request as to the truth versus falsehood of the
information.
Indeed, insomuch as the public distinction matters, it seems to raise
more questions than it answers.  Specifically, the potential impact on
206 Id.
207 Essentially, all this does is turn a public request into a non-public conversation.  There
seems to be no mechanism for a company to direct members of the public to otherwise publi-
cally available information, which is strange in light of the public interest in the free flow of
information.  This is particularly concerning in light of the fact that a patient/consumer cannot
“buy” the drug in question without first getting a physician to prescribe it.
208 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 8.
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prescribers and consumers could vary extensively between different
“public” forums.  The 2011 Draft Guidance lumps together questions at
live presentations,209 posted questions on web sites,210 and responses by
a firm on its own web site211 as “public.”  But the potential audience of
the information in each of these can vary widely.  For example, attendees
at a conference may constitute a particular subset of the public as a
whole—i.e., medical doctors—and as such, may interpret responses by
the firm in a very different manner than ordinary consumers.
Viewed in light of the public interest justification of benefitting so-
ciety from having prior regulatory approval, truthful information made
available to the general public by a firm—e.g., on its web site—should
be treated differently from statements spoken in a public atmosphere
where the audience is composed of specialists.  This is all the more im-
portant when information is communicated orally rather than in writing.
Written communications—which might include oral presentations that
are recorded and made available publicly—have the potential to influ-
ence a much wider audience than those made solely in oral presentations.
As we explain in the following section, the distinction between written
and oral communication should play a role in the development of more
fundamental reforms to the regulation of information about off-label uses
of prescription drugs.
B. Principles for Reforming Regulation of Off-Label Marketing of
Prescription Drugs
1. Truthfulness and Transparency
Given the dangers of criminal prosecution of pharmaceutical com-
panies and their representatives for misbranding, off-label prescription
drug use remains a proverbial “third rail” within the halls of drug compa-
nies and a “dirty little secret” within the overall healthcare marketplace.
As a result, companies often do not attempt to quantify or even acknowl-
edge the off-label use in their business dealings and forecasts.  In the
pharmaceutical industry, off-label use is sometimes euphemistically re-
ferred to as “spontaneous use,” but the reality is that off-label decisions
by physicians are anything but spontaneous and are subject to malprac-
tice liability if made inappropriately.  A 2006 study of 150 drugs re-
vealed that off-label use ranged from 1% to 46% within therapeutic
classes.212  Only 7% to 54% of off-label use was supported by what the
209 Id. at 4.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 4–5.
212 David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein, & Randall S. Stafford, Off-label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 66 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006).
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authors would consider “strong scientific support.”213  Put another way,
21% of the 725 million prescriptions studied were for off-label uses.214
Fully 73% of the off-label uses lacked any “firm scientific” evidence.215
As off-label prescriptions are often well-thought-out medical decisions,
Congress and the FDA have been reluctant to prevent the practice of
prescribing a drug for uses that have not been approved by the FDA.
We agree with the FDA that all written and oral off-label informa-
tion must be truthful, non-misleading, accurate and balanced.  As dis-
cussed in Part III.B.3, we suggest that any off-label oral discussion must
be always preceded by, and based on the distribution of, the appropriate
printed documentation.  The liability for disseminating false or mislead-
ing information should squarely fall on the company and its agents.  The
learned intermediary doctrine216 should not be available to protect drug
companies from product liability claims based on off-label uses pro-
moted in response to solicited or unsolicited requests for off-label
information.
But there remains a significant gap in the marketplace of informa-
tion.  Companies, investors, and the public have a vested interest in
knowing how drugs are used.  We propose that the FDA adopt regula-
tions requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to measure and deliver a
statistically validated report of drug usage by indication that quantifies
the amount of off-label use for its product.  If total off-label use repre-
sents more than say 5% of new or total prescriptions, the company
should be required to break out the off-label use into its sub-uses.  If an
individual off-label use exceeds a specified percentage of overall use or a
specified dollar threshold, then the company should be required to sub-
mit a supplemental New Drug Application.  The FDA should impose
fines that penalize any drug company for significant and persistent off-
label use of its product without providing sufficient, accurate, and bal-
anced information to the marketplace.
This proposal builds on the suggestion in Western States Medical
that one alternative to a complete ban on advertising compounding drugs
is to limit the total amount of compounding.217  It also parallels the Se-
curities Exchange Act requirement that once an issuer has more than
2,000 holders of record or 500 non-accredited holders of record and as-
213 Id. at 1024
214 Id. at 1023.
215 Id.
216 See generally, e.g., Robert J. Friedman, Take Two of These and Sue Me in the Morn-
ing: Efficacy of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Prescription Drug Failure to Warn
Cases, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 278 (2009) (discussing the learned intermediary doctrine in the
context of prescription drug failure-to-warn cases).
217 Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002).
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sets in excess of $10 million, it must register that class of securities under
the Securities Exchange Act and provide periodic reports.218
2. Differentiate Based on the Sophistication of the Listener, the
Speaker and the Type of Information
The FDA’s current approach to off-label promotion is over-inclu-
sive because it bans the dissemination of truthful scientific and medical
information to sophisticated listeners who are not only capable of making
informed treatment choices but who actually make the final decision to
prescribe medication to patients.  It also minimizes the benefits a broader
audience would gain from easier access to truthful information upon re-
quest and fails to reflect the training of the speaker and the different
types of off-label information provided.  Our approach strongly affirms a
company’s right to distribute truthful and non-misleading off-label infor-
mation to the marketplace when the benefits of that information for a
given class of listener outweighs the risk of harm to the patient.  As a
general rule, the greater the sophistication of the listener and the speaker
and the more independently reliable the information, the less restrictive
the FDA limits on dissemination should be.
The 2011 Draft Guidance offers no protection when a drug repre-
sentative solicits a request for off-label information when meeting one-
on-one with a physician.  This encourages an artificial context in which
the sales representative and physician “dance around” the topic of off-
label information.  Yet why should it matter whether the physician or the
representative initiates the discussion as long as the information provided
is scientific and not unduly promotional in nature?  It is difficult to see
how any public interest is harmed by the accurate disclosure of truthful
scientific information.  The pursuit of knowledge that has undergone val-
idation, testing, and acceptance by the scientific community arguably
constitutes the type of commercial speech that is most worthy of protec-
tion under the First Amendment.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Sorrell, physicians are sophis-
ticated consumers of medical and scientific information who are better
able to evaluate such information and to weigh the costs and benefits of
unapproved uses than untrained recipients of that information.  For that
reason, the FDA should permit drug sales representatives to offer solic-
ited or unsolicited off-label scientific information (which we classify fur-
ther in the following Subsection) to a Tier I recipient, which we define as
a medical professional with a medical degree (i.e., M.D. or D.O.) from
an accredited medical school with a state medical license in good stand-
ing.  The Tier I medical professional is akin to the sophisticated investor
218 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A) (2006).
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who is able to fend for himself or herself and is eligible to receive offers
of unregistered securities in a private placement under section 4(a)(2) of
the Securities Act without the need for a prospectus.219
There are significant discrepancies in the training of the various
medical audiences that influence an individual listener’s ability to com-
prehend and safely interpret the information provided.  For that reason,
we would prohibit the unsolicited dissemination of off-label Class 2 or 3
promotional information (see discussion of classes of information infra
Part III.B.3) to (1) Tier II medical practitioners, which we define as pro-
fessional medical care providers who are not Tier I medical profession-
als, such as a physician assistant or nurse practitioner, who have legal
authority to prescribe medications and a license in good standing, or (2)
Tier III healthcare workers, non-Tier I or II individuals whose main re-
sponsibilities are directly interacting with patients or working within an
institution primarily in direct contact with patients (e.g., those working in
medical offices, hospitals, clinics, physical therapy departments, and
long term care facilities).
The justification for distinguishing between Tier I and Tier II/III
providers is that medical doctors have sufficient education and experi-
ence to understand the mechanisms by which prescription drugs operate.
Medical doctors have a more in-depth understanding of pathophysiology,
i.e., how a patient’s body will respond to medication in scenarios other
than those for which the drug has received approval.  Nurse practitioners,
physicians’ assistants, and similarly situated healthcare providers typi-
cally lack this level of knowledge and understanding.
We would, however, permit Tier IV medical stakeholders, which we
define as healthcare payers or other industry stakeholders with direct
knowledge and interest in the healthcare business, including health insur-
ance issuers, pharmacy benefit managers, group health plans, and federal
or state governmental agencies, to receive solicited and unsolicited off-
label information.  The key difference between Tier II/III and Tier IV is
that payers cannot prescribe any medication, whereas nurse practitioners
and physician assistants have the ability to prescribe.  Payers should have
access to information regarding off-label use in order to facilitate pay-
ments and the provision of funding, but since they are unable to pre-
scribe, there is no harm in giving them full exposure to this information.
A key aspect of our proposal is that we would prohibit the distribu-
tion of any off-label information at the initiative of pharmaceutical com-
panies to Tier V consumers, that is, unsophisticated individuals, such as a
lay patient, a caregiver, or a legal guardian for the patient.  However, we
agree with the proposal in the 2011 Draft Guidance to permit the distri-
219 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
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bution of information that is otherwise publicly available in response to a
Tier V consumer request.  All written information provided, as per the
2011 Draft Guidance, however, will be greatly restricted in its appear-
ance and provided with appropriate contact information for a learned/
sophisticated intermediary if follow-up questions exist from them or any
medical professional they enlist.  The responsibility of either intermedi-
ary is to ensure that the less sophisticated listener is protected from harm
and educated appropriately to balance the information given.  As will be
done for all protected off-label information shared in the marketplace,
copies should be numbered and trackable to ensure that any attendant
liability can be traced.  Similar to the status quo, companies will be
strictly prohibited from dissemination of non-publically available off-la-
bel information to Tier V consumers.
3. Types of Protected Disclosures and Prescribed Formats
Although the FDA has provided some guidance about the appear-
ance and disclosures required for off-label information, we believe that
stronger and clearer guidance is needed.  Drawing analogies from regula-
tion of the financial markets, we propose that the FDA classify the vari-
ous types of information and restrict dissemination based on the
prospective listener’s needs and ability to easily identify and assess both
the risks and benefits of the content.  We also suggest varying formats
for dissemination depending on where the information is situated on the
spectrum from pure science to pure commercial promotion.
We suggest the FDA define a series of classes of information.
Class 1 information would consist of promotional materials regarding
labeled indications.  The existing legal regime applies to this type of in-
formation. Class 2 information would consist of peer-reviewed publica-
tions regarding off-label use.  The definition of a peer-reviewed
publication may be taken from section 401 of the now-expired Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, which permits the dis-
tribution of medical information regarding new uses as long as it in-
cludes, among other requirements, a list of articles from “a scientific
reference publication or scientific or medical journal.”220  The distribu-
tion of such articles must maintain a non-adulterated appearance (i.e., the
information should not be tailored or changed in any way), and all fund-
ing or potential conflicts must be clearly acknowledged.  We also pro-
pose that, similar to SEC-guided financial reports, each document be
numbered and printed using a color-coded border identifying the docu-
ment as discussing an off-label use and that such document be available
only for Tier I medical professionals.  These documents will be required
220 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(6)(B) (2006).
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to be filed with the FDA and must use only an FDA-approved border
scheme.  Distribution records of the recipients and the time and place of
distribution should be kept by the manufacturer and possibly submitted
to the FDA upon request.221
Class 3 information would consist of non-peer reviewed medical
articles or publication of clinical results intended to inform medical pro-
fessionals.  To qualify as permissible disclosure, all information should
be narrowly tailored to address the specific issue or clinical result the
company would like to disseminate.  Such documents should be granted
FDA approval prior to sharing in the marketplace, akin to an offering
circular pursuant to a Regulation A offering.222  Similar to Class 2, these
non-peer-reviewed articles must be printed on paper identifying this ma-
terial as discussing off-label indications and be available for use only by
Tier 1 medical professionals.  The FDA might also consider further
formatting requirements to minimize the promotional appearance of
Class 3 information.  For instance, Class 3 documents might be required
to use only black and white text and charts, similar to the requirements
for a tombstone advertisement under the securities laws.223
4. Additional Responsibilities for Firms Disseminating Off-Label
Information
Because drug companies are the most significant financial benefi-
ciaries of off-label product use, they should bear the responsibility for
assuring that accurate and appropriately crafted information is delivered
to the market.  We suggest that the FDA subject any pharmaceutical
company pursuing an off-label information dissemination strategy to four
ongoing requirements: training, monitoring, reporting, and auditing.
As for training, we suggest that firms be required to supply docu-
mented training of all speakers224 on the printed material and the regula-
tions for oral discussion.  To that end, we suggest developing a formal
registration accreditation program for sales representatives similar to the
221 The 2011 Draft Guidance provides a helpful list of recordkeeping requirements. See
2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 9.
222 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g) (2013) (providing for SEC approval of offering state-
ments, including the offering circular, by rendering them qualified after 20 days unless the
SEC intervenes); id. § 230.253 (specifying the required contents of an offering circular under
Regulation A, the conditional small issues exemption).
223 See id. § 230.134 (providing that an advertisement containing only the most basic
factual information about an issuer and an offering does not constitute a prospectus).  The
2011 Draft Guidance supplies a list of requirements for the transmission of unbiased informa-
tion which can provide inspiration in this context. See 2011 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 16,
at 8–9.
224 The speakers will primarily be registered sales representatives who ultimately are re-
sponsible for the majority of the interactions, but all other paid representatives/agents of the
company should also be included.
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Series 7 exam.  All company training materials should be on record with
the FDA for discretionary review but should not necessarily require FDA
approval for use.  Training does not necessarily need to be done in per-
son but can be performed via technological means.  Currently, many
sales representatives go through training for peer-reviewed studies for
approved indications, during which they are told how to respond to cer-
tain types of questions and to whom to refer questions they cannot an-
swer.  The purpose of the training requirement is to ensure that a
representative is adequately prepared regarding the off-label information
he or she is presenting to a doctor.
Second, the activities of speakers should be regularly reviewed and
monitored by company sales training personnel and management with
written documentation of results.  It is essential to ensure that the repre-
sentatives are accurately conveying the information regarding off-label
use.  Such monitoring is particularly justified in the context of off-label
marketing because patient safety is at issue.  This reflects the fundamen-
tal principle of transparency—ensuring that a company can demonstrate
to the FDA that it is tracking the activities of its representatives and mak-
ing an effort to ensure compliance with the rules regarding the dissemi-
nation of off-label information under the tier and classification system
we previously articulated.
Third, reports tracking the dissemination of Class 2 and Class 3 pro-
tected information, as well as exception reports, should be submitted to
the FDA.225  We anticipate there will be circumstances where a regis-
tered sales representative may orally divulge off-label information with-
out the appropriate written documents because dissemination of written
material was impractical (e.g., a sales representative in an operating
room suggests off-label use of a specific product based on specific evi-
dence).  Furthermore, we anticipate other conversations where an unso-
licited question may raise an issue beyond the scope of the printed
material or a representative may become concerned that a specific con-
versation might have the appearance of violating the above requirements.
In such cases, the drug firm should be required to file an exception report
with the FDA.  This resembles the filing required by Regulation FD
when an issuer realizes it has impermissibly selectively disclosed mate-
rial nonpublic information to institutional investors.226  Exception reports
225 This is akin to the Form D that issuers must file when selling securities pursuant to the
exemptions from registration set forth in Regulation D.  Form D is a brief notice that includes
basic information about the company and the offering, such as the names and addresses of the
company’s executive officers, the size of the offering and the date of first sale. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.503 (requiring the filing of Form D when an issuer relies on Rule 504, 505, or 506 under
Regulation D); id. § 239.500 (specifying the contents of Form D).
226 See id. § 243.100 (mandating disclosure to the public upon the disclosure of any “ma-
terial nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities” to broker-dealers, invest-
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will provide the company with an important closed loop that it may au-
dit.  The reports will also provide the FDA with a trackable source of
what additional written information the market needs, thereby providing
important guidance about what should be changed or added to existing
protected material.  Sales representatives should be accountable to their
employers to file this paperwork or face disciplinary action, thus giving
employers some enforceability and control to manage the speech of their
representatives that otherwise might have been encouraged by the
Caronia decision.
This reflects the importance of transparency and meeting the mar-
ket’s need for information.  This also benefits pharmaceutical firms be-
cause it gives them the ability to identify the issues and questions raised
by their customers and to find a way to answer such questions appropri-
ately. Caronia is likely to have a negative impact on pharmaceutical
firms from a compliance perspective because it may encourage repre-
sentatives to speak freely, beyond what the pharmaceutical company it-
self would prefer its representatives say.  If representatives are not
submitting reports as required, the company has a legitimate reason to
discipline or terminate them.  The thrust of our approach gives represent-
atives the freedom to speak regarding off-label use under certain condi-
tions in order to promote the public interest in the dissemination of truth,
but mandates that they also divulge such speech to the pharmaceutical
company and FDA.
Finally, we recommend that the FDA require companies to under-
take a third party audit of some of the conversations with medical profes-
sionals.  (Of course, there would also be a requirement to act on the
information received.)  This audit should cover both the recipients and
non-recipients of off-label information.  The importance of a third-party
audit derives from the need to make sure that the reports are adequate,
that representatives are in fact talking to doctors, and that doctors are
getting accurate information from the interaction, rather than receiving
misleading or otherwise inaccurate information.  This four-part frame-
work makes it more likely that the benefits to society from the limited
disclosure of truthful off-label usage information by pharmaceutical
companies and their representatives will outweigh the potential costs,
and would give such firms a safe harbor to train sales representatives and
develop predictable norms of corporate compliance.227
ment advisers, investment companies, and current shareholders who may trade on such
information).
227 Finally, it is worth mentioning that a 1935 Michigan Supreme Court decision permit-
ted experimentation (i.e., off-label use) without malpractice liability, setting a standard for
appropriate experimentation without liability as long as the patient consented and the use did
not “vary too radically” from accepted methods of procedure.  Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762
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CONCLUSION
In this Article we have discussed both the dangerous implications of
the majority’s approach in Caronia for efficient economic regulation in
general and have charted a path forward by articulating a new standard
for regulating the dissemination of information about the off-label use of
pharmaceutical drugs that would withstand constitutional scrutiny.  By
anchoring this regulatory regime in promoting the public good, rather
than paternalism, and subjecting these restraints to intermediate scrutiny
under Central Hudson as long as they do not discriminate between indus-
try participants, our approach comports with the theoretical justification
for restricting truthful commercial speech under the First Amendment
and reflects the underlying considerations motivating the Supreme Court
in Sorrell.
Indeed, as we discussed in Part II, securities regulation can serve as
a useful analogous framework for articulating a more nuanced approach
to regulating off-label marketing.  Many of the challenges faced by the
two regimes are similar and reflect the fundamental tension between per-
mitting the distribution of information that facilitates welfare-enhancing
transactions while promoting the public good by reducing the variance of
outcomes among market participants.  Specific exemptions to restrictions
on offers for the sale of securities, such as the accredited and sophisti-
cated investor categories under Regulation D, can serve as an example
for formulating similar exemptions to restrictions on the distribution of
truthful information regarding the efficacy and safety of off-label use of
prescription drugs.  In Part III, we articulated a concrete proposal for
reforming the FDA’s rules on off-label marketing based on these general
principles and analogous lessons from the securities laws.  Distinguish-
ing between types of information and the intended audience is essential
to ensuring that the distribution of facts regarding off-label uses of pre-
scription drugs furthers legitimate public interests rather than unconstitu-
tional paternalism.
At the heart of our argument lies the fundamental point that the
majority’s approach in Caronia reflects a false dilemma.  It is unneces-
sary to take a binary, either/or approach to regulating truthful commer-
cial speech.  Promoting the free flow of truthful information is a worthy
goal in a liberal democracy.  But the potential harm to the public from
risky pharmaceutical drugs is real.  Just as with the capital markets, it
takes only a few catastrophes to undermine the trust and confidence es-
sential to the proper functioning of the pharmaceutical and healthcare
industries.  Advancing a public interest such as this justifies limited re-
(Mich. 1935).  We see this as a matter for state law and the appropriate licensing authorities
rather than as something that should be addressed through FDA regulation.
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strictions on truthful commercial speech, provided that the government
has a rational basis for doing so and the restraint itself satisfies the Cen-
tral Hudson framework.
In short, as important as the free flow of information is, our society
already made the decision to reject the anti-regulatory ideology of the
Lochner era—and for good reason.  As the recent financial crisis vividly
demonstrated, the absence of adequate regulation can lead to market in-
efficiencies and unnecessary suffering among the weakest in society.
Restricting speech is often inextricably tied to regulating underlying
transactions.  The solution to the danger of excessive paternalism is to
prohibit this specific ill, not to render the regulation of advertising, mar-
keting, and offers to transact outside the ambit of government regulation.
The purpose of the First Amendment is to facilitate political liberty and
individual autonomy, not a laissez-faire false utopia of unrestricted com-
mercial promotion.
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